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ABSTRACT
As the most popular destination country for migrants and refugees in the EU since the
end of World War II (MPI, 2004), Germany has a history of refugee inflows. In this thesis I
focus on the different factors that led to asylum policy change in reunified Germany, from liberal
since 1945 to restrictive, after the end of the Cold War in 1992, with the 1992 amendment of
Article 16 of the German Basic Law. The study of the factors that account for German asylum
policy change is important to understand the future of German asylum policy, and potentially
provide a model of asylum policy change in other countries. In this study, I analyze German
public opinion that seems to have been affected by large migrant inflows and the declining state
of the economy. I argue that electoral pressures by the German public contributed to political
party platform changes and asylum policy change. I use data from Eurobaromeer surveys, the
World Bank, and the Migration Policy Institute to describe the refugee inflows and the state of
the German economy, and how these may have contributed to public opinion, as reflected in
Eurobarometer survey results. I examine German political party platforms and campaign tactics
based on secondary literature, such as scholarly articles and studies, as well as political speeches
and statements. I also consider Germany’s membership in the EU as a factor that may have
affected the change in German asylum policy. Germany’s membership in the EU may have been
used as a form of leverage by the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), to pressure the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), to compromise on asylum policy restrictions, as Germany’s
constitutional right to asylum impeded the implementation of EU asylum policy provisions. The
findings of my research suggest that German public sentiments may have affected Germany’s
political party platforms. Evidently, the SPD, aligned its political platform and policy agenda to
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align with the changes in the German electoral context and gain electoral support. Also,
Germany’s position as a founding member of the EU, may have contributed to the compromise
on German asylum policy change, because the right to asylum as explained in Article 16 of the
constitution, withheld Germany from utilizing the EU’s asylum procedures and policies, until
Article 16 was amended in 1992.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Germany has become one of the most significant destination countries for immigrants,
specifically refugees, since the end of World War II (MPI, 2004). During the current wake of
the Syrian Refugee Crisis, 476,501 refugees applied for asylum in Germany in 2015 alone
(Eurostat, 2015). Whether to hold onto strict refugee admissions policies, or take a
predominantly humanitarian policy stance as a response to refugee inflows, is an ongoing
debate. At the end of World War II, humanitarianism and the international recognition of
refugees resulted in Western Germany’s notably permissive refugee admissions stance.
However, since the end of the Cold War, restrictions on asylum admissions became
commonplace. The question I examine in this thesis is: Why did Germany’s asylum admissions
policies become more restrictive at the end of the Cold War, when the principle of West
German asylum policy was liberal since its post-WWII implementation?

1.1 Historical Background
The 1951 United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
was the first to establish the recognition and treatment of refugees on an international scale. As
a signatory at the 1951 United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, international regulations on refugee rights were bound into West Germany’s asylum
policy (UNHCR). The Allies’ presence in West Germany, after the end of WWII in 1945, also
contributed to the establishment of a liberal democratic political regime that aligned more
closely with the West German constitution and allowed for the integration of asylum rights into
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this Constitution (Judt, 2005). However, the 1949 Basic Law for the Republic of Germany
(Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) contributed more directly to the established
of the inherent right to asylum in Article 16. Article 16 of the Basic Law was the first of its kind
in Germany, as asylum policy was previously not accounted for as a constitutionally binding
right. The most important provision established in the article is stated in Sentence 2: ‘Persons
persecuted on political grounds should have the right to asylum’ (Library of Congress, 2016).
This means that regardless of one’s country of origin, if one meets the requirements of gaining
asylum in West Germany, one is automatically granted asylum. The requirements being that
one’s reasons for fleeing one’s country of origin and seeking asylum in West Germany are
attributed to political persecution. This liberal principle stood as the main provision for asylum
admissions in Western Germany until the early 1990s.
After the end of the Cold War and German reunification in 1989, asylum applications in
Germany increased significantly as the fall of the Iron Curtain prompted the opening of East
European borders, allowing East European refugees to seek asylum in Germany. Along with the
increase in asylum applications at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the German economy
faced high levels of inflation and income inequality as the East German economy was integrated
into that of West Germany. These migrant and economic pressures contributed to the perceived
need for asylum policy restriction among the German public and political parties.
The governing parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union
(CSU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the main opposition party, Social Democratic
Party (SPD) agreed on the amendment of Article 16 of Germany’s Basic Law on asylum in
November of 1992 (Fijalkowski, 1993). This amendment allowed for the expulsion of refugees
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back to the safe third country to which they first arrived, whereas before, asylum was granted
regardless of their country of origin and it was unlawful to send a refugee back. Conservative
values and EU asylum provisions had the upper hand in shaping asylum policy and limiting
admittance of refugees from this point forward.

1.2 Explaining the Policy Change
Different factors may account for the asylum restrictions imposed at the end of the Cold
War in Germany. The specific causal factors that I examine in this thesis are the German
political party strategies, such as political party agendas and campaign strategies that resulted
from social pressures, such as anti-immigrant public opinion and violent acts on refugees. These
social pressures were enhanced by the immigration pressures felt following the fall of the Iron
Curtain and increasing refugee inflows from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as economic
changes after the Oil Crisis in 1973. Additionally, the EU and its binding agreements may have
facilitated the policy change process.

1.3 Purpose
As a major European power and the engine of EU integration, Germany plays the crucial
role of a prominent global actor for its economic, political and cultural influence worldwide.
Further, as one of the most popular asylum destinations, Germany hosted more asylum seekers
than any other member state in the EU from the end of World War II (Hellman & Bosche, 2006).
Therefore, the study of its asylum policy is crucial to understanding and predicting future
patterns of refugee admissions and treatment policies in Germany and other EU members. The
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case I focus on in this thesis is especially compelling due to the fact that Germany previously
held onto a notably permissive platform on asylum policy, but evidently, as a result of the
Eastern and Central European refugee inflows in 1992-93, asylum admission policies became
more restrictive as a deterrence mechanism. The German case can be used as a model to predict
how other nations may react during similar international refugee crises. In the midst of the
current Syrian refugee crisis, it is important to take into consideration the development of
Germany’s asylum policy in order to better understand the present-day policy decision-making in
regards to asylum, in Germany, as well as other culturally, economically, and politically
powerful nations.

1.4 Literature Review
Germany, a country historically known for its emigration throughout the 19th and early
20th century, became one of the major destination countries for immigrants, particularly, refugees
at the end of World War II and throughout the 1950’s, (MPI, 2004). After World War II
Germany faced the daunting task of reconstruction while dealing with constant Eastern European
refugee inflows. At this point in time, Germany was separated into East Germany or the German
Democratic Republic, and West Germany, or the Federal Republic. Ideology and regime types
differed greatly between the two. The Federal Republic held a liberal approach to refugee
admission and followed the German constitutional provisions for granting asylum according to
the Basic Law. In the German Democratic Republic, as a territory of the Soviet Union, asylum
was not consistently recognized and refugees were processed arbitrarily (Poutrus, 2014). The
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German Basic Law was solely followed by the German Federal Republic until German
reunification in 1989, and after reunification applied to Germany as a whole.
The Federal Republic’s Parliamentary Council enacted the Basic Law to the German
Constitution to provide legal and humanitarian protection of refugees arriving to Germany. The
Basic Law and its exceptionally permissive asylum granting provision were met with disapproval
from nationalistic German political parties and constituents. The asylum provision established in
the Basic Law as defined in Article 16, allowed the politically persecuted to have the right to
asylum following the principles established during the 1951 United Nations Convention and
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The principles established at the convention were
groundbreaking developments in international human rights law and as a signatory Germany was
bound to carry out these humanitarian guidelines within its own national asylum law (UNHCR).
Although the Basic Law’s right to asylum was known to be liberal, and constrained the
development of restrictions on asylum law, it was preserved as Western Germany’s main
Constitutional law on asylum from 1949 until its amendment after German reunification in 1992.
Following the Asylum Compromise of 1992, Article 16 of the German Basic Law was amended.
The amendment concluded that those seeking asylum may not be guaranteed the right on the
grounds of political persecution because of their country of origin (Hailbronner, 1994).
One of the main explanations in the literature for the change in asylum policy was the
political pressure to enhance the restrictions on German asylum policy that may have been
caused by the electoral strength of constituents’ grievances, right wing political party pressure,
and increasing immigration. The massive influx of mainly Eastern European refugees as result of
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989 placed an even greater amount of political pressure
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on parties of the Left that supported Article 16 of the Basic Law. By 1992, 438,200 refugees
sought asylum in Germany alone (UNHCR, 2001) and caused tensions to rise.
The social grievances among local jurisdictions (Länder), such as those felt between
Munich and Bavaria (Karapin, 2003), xenophobic attacks on refugees, and anti-immigrant
demonstrations contributed to highlighting the need for further asylum provisions. The strong
influences of anti-immigrant groups showed predominant disapproval from the German public
regarding the asylum law, as the anti-immigrant movements grew in strength and in numbers
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. As elite-level politicians witnessed their constituents’
policy demands, their platforms to aligned with these demands, in order to secure their electoral
support. These different elite groups were comprised of local-level officials such as city
administrators, some of which were mayors and political party leaders, as well as Länder and
federal level politicians.
As explained by Geddes, German public debate drew attention to the constraining nature
of the constitutional asylum law, and highlighted the public fear of losing control over refugee
inflows and territory, and the costs of large numbers of refugees. Geddes also found that in a
1991 opinion poll concluded that 76 percent of the German public agreed that an amendment to
Article 16 was needed (2003).
Throughout the 1980s, constituent opinions and German political party agendas played
off of each other to intensify the perceived need of refugee restrictions. As mentioned by
Bosswick, the development of asylum policy from 1953 through the 1980s was characterized by
the increasing realization among public and political sectors, that Article 16 was limiting the
development of further asylum restrictions (2000). The 1981, 1984, and 1987 German election
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campaigns highlighted the need for stricter asylum policies. Bosswick mentions that in the 1987
national elections, Conservative parties such as the governing Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) party, placed political pressure on the Social Democrats who defended Article 16, for
having neglected the need to reform the German right to asylum (2000).
Another important factor that should be taken into consideration as a social influence on
German political party asylum positions is that of the economic costs of reunification. Piotrowicz
argues that the economic costs placed a significant burden on West Germany to maintain a stable
economy (1998). As seen in a study of the effects of German unification and immigration on the
income distribution conducted by Grabka, Schwarze, and Wager (1999), the effects of the
economic and social standards in East Germany were far less developed than those in West
Germany at the time of reunification.
Further, the EU played a main role in creating restrictions to German asylum policies as a
response to the Schengen and Dublin Agreements. The Schengen Agreement specifies that
signatories would be part of an area of free movement with one single external border in place of
internal borders (EC Europa, 2016). The Dublin Regulation specified that the first EU nation that
a refugee arrives in is responsible for processing their application.
The binding agreements implemented as a member of the European Union, further
catalyzed Germany’s asylum restrictions. The Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992, at the end of the
Cold War era and the beginning of German reunification, was carried out in support of European
integration and empowerment among member states. The shared responsibility of maintaining
stability and unity among the EU member nations enabled Germany to use the EC’s Schengen
and Dublin Regulations to its advantage, as they supported security measures and the safe third-
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country principle. The 1985 Schengen Agreement specifies that signatories would be part of an
area of free movement with one single external border in place of internal borders (Council of
the EU, 2001).
Before the amendment of the Basic Law in 1992, Germany was constrained from
benefiting from the EU asylum policies, as these policies went against Article 16. This was yet
another reason why those supporting German asylum restrictions pushed for the amendment.
After the amendment, Germany, with the help of the EU, resolved the domestic asylum problems
by encouraging restrictive asylum policy aligning with the Dublin and Schengen Agreements and
created one of the most restrictive asylum policies in the EU (Hellman & Bosche, 2006, p. 53,
54).
Although the literature I compiled examines different factors that may have led to the
asylum policy reform, the mechanism of the connection between the social pressures and the
behavior of political parties has not been explored. Each explanation emphasizes one or two
specific factors, but does not go as far as examining their inter-connections, that is, the
connection between public pressures and political party responses. In this thesis I examine more
closely how the costs of immigrant inflows and economic instability after reunification increased
social pressures and the role that these pressures placed on political parties’ political and
electoral strategies that may have eventually led to the amendment of the law. In addition, I
consider the role the German media as a reflection of German public opinion, and political party
platforms and campaign strategies. I will also take into account the effects that EU membership
had on facilitating this process, as it was only briefly mentioned by the literature.
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1.5 Methodology
The methodology I employ in my thesis includes conducting research using secondary
sources on Germany’s asylum policy; I conduct a thorough review of the literature and collect
data on political campaign strategies as depicted in the media, political party reports, public
opinion data, and also migration and economic data from sources such as Eurostat,
Eurobarometer, the World Bank and the UNHCR.
Based on scholarly research articles and books, I gained insight on the chronological
development of Germany’s asylum policy, the factors leading to the restrictive change in asylum
policy, as well the implications of this policy change. Policy briefings and historical analysis on
the development of asylum policies at the European level, provided information about the
European Union as a catalyst in furthering the policy restrictions by detailing the provisions and
interpretation of EU policies and treaties, such as the Dublin Regulation, and the Schengen
Agreement.
Political campaign strategies depicted in the media and reports on public opinion, such as
Eurobarometer, provide the information to evaluate how attitudes towards immigrants were
distributed among the electorate. I use the data from Eurobarometer surveys and longitudinal
studies on German political party campaign strategies to explore the connection between the
policy stances of political parties and constituent attitudes. I also use a study of the case of
Munich to illustrate the impact of local-level interest groups and political elites on asylum policy
change at the national level. Lastly, the data collected from Eurostat, the World Bank and the
UNHCR provide reliable quantitative data of asylum seeker inflows throughout Germany’s
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history- more specifically, after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The economic data provided by the
World Bank is used to demonstrate how economic pressures may have created greater tension. I
use these data to examine the links among migrant inflows and the state of the economy,
constituent attitudes, and political party policy positions, specifically patterns of influxes in
migration to Germany, how they correlate with anti-immigrant public opinions, and shifts in
political party asylum platforms.

1.6 Organization
This chapter, Chapter one, is an introduction to the research question, literature, and
research design. In the second chapter, I provide the historical background of Germany’s asylum
admissions policies since 1945. I describe the formation and implementation of international
asylum recognition and the German constitutional asylum provisions formed after World War II.
In addition, I describe the policy changes on asylum that occurred between the end of WWII in
1945 and the end of the Cold War era in 1992. In chapter three, I examine the political party
positions that may have accounted for increased restrictions, and how the media reflected public
opinion and political party platforms and campaign tactics. I explain how political pressures, as a
result of immigrant inflows and the state of the economy, may have influenced public opinion
during the mid-1970s through the early 1990s, and contributed to constituent pressures such as
anti-immigrant public opinion and violence towards refugees, and ultimately influenced German
political party positions and campaign tactics. Political party positions can be traced to the
Conservative and Left parties’ concerns about electoral costs. Chapter four describes the
European Union’s role in facilitating Germany’s restrictive policy changes with the
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implementation of supranational agreements such as the Schengen Agreement and Dublin
Regulation. Lastly, chapter five concludes and discusses the implications drawn from my
research.

1.7 Findings
The findings of this study suggest that the changes in the electoral environment such as
constituent concerns about migrant inflows and economic instability, favoritism of the
CDU/CSU party, as well as the emergence of the Eastern German constituency after German
reunification, contributed to the change in political party platforms, particularly that of the SPD.
The SPD’s need for alignment with and support from the new German constituency that emerged
after the fall of the iron curtain in 1989, encouraged the reformulation of their political party
tactics and policy platforms, and shaped them to appeal to the German public, with the intention
of winning the plurality of votes in the 1994 federal elections. Mobilized by local level interest
groups and political elites, local constituency grievances regarding influxes in migrant inflow,
high unemployment rates, and the need to protect the German welfare state from non-EC
migrants, seems to have prompted the SPD party to change its platform to move more to the right
on social issues. This new platform moved the SPD closer to their opposition, the CDU, on
asylum policy change in 1992. Also, Germany’s EU membership contributed to the need to align
German asylum policy with European-level asylum policy, as Article 16 did not align with the
EU’s Dublin Regulation on asylum. The CDU used the notion that the SPD was holding back
necessary asylum policy changes that would allow German asylum policy to coincide with EUlevel asylum policy. This pressure from the opposition seems to have also contributed to the
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SPD’s agreement to asylum policy change and the amendment of Article 16 of the German Basic
law in 1989.

Chapter 2: Historical Background
In this chapter I describe the historical events, public attitude changes and policy changes
that occurred from the post-World War II constitutional establishment of the right to asylum in
1945 in West Germany, leading up to the 1992 amendment on Article 16 of the German Basic
Law. This will establish the setting and context for the study of the factors that led to social and
electoral pressures and ultimately, the asylum policy change.
At the end of World War II, the geopolitical landscape of Europe changed drastically as
the Soviet Union established the eastern European bloc, and Western Europe remained under the
financial and military assistance, and political influence of the Allies throughout the
reconstruction period (Judt, 2005). The Allies’ occupation of West Germany at the end of the
war, specifically by the United States, played an important role in establishing a liberal
democratic political regime that served as not only a political, but also as a social revolution in
Germany. The Allies engaged in a campaign to re-educate the West German Society and aimed
at establishing a democratic mentality among the public and better ensure the removal of Nazi
principles that had been embedded in German society during the WWII era (Mazower, 1998).
These liberal principles were carried through many of the policies introduced during this time
period. Western Germany was one of the more accepting and cooperative nations when it came
to Americanization and westernization of regime type during the post-war reconstruction (Judt,
2005). This was thought to be because of the generally unanimous perspective on the rebuilding
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of a new national identity after experiencing a tainted recent history. This was seen as a way to
help restore a more positive image internationally, as well as rebuild German nationalistic pride1
(Judt, 2005).
One of the main politically stabilizing factors that was brought on by the Allies’ influence
was the West German Government’s decentralized governmental structure that placed the
Länder in greater control of the local level administrative constructs as the Bundestrat
represented their political interests at the federal level. The federal Government and Länder
alike, actively took part in maintaining peace throughout the social and economic sectors by
utilizing Social Market legislation, where the German Government allowed for a free market, but
still intervened in economic functions such as the social welfare state and state-level markets
(Judt, 2005). This democratic structure still plays a crucial role in the way that local-level politics
is carried into higher levels of government, enabling the local-level constituents to influence the
top levels of government and policy making. That Western Germany was also able to enhance its
political stabilization can be attributed to their joining NATO (North Atlantic Trade
Organization) in 1955. This helped create a stronger and more stable economy and social
structure by establishing this trade and defense alliance with economically and militarily strong
nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Italy, and Belgium.
After coming out of the war defeated and unstable, Germany faced the daunting task of
political, social and economic reconstruction along with managing inflows of ethnic Germans,
Eastern Europeans and other displaced persons seeking asylum. During the period of 1936-1948,
1

Germany’s nationalistic pride was depleted after the events of WWII. Many Germans felt uneasy
showing pride for their nation due to their tainted history that was marked by the Third Reich regime,
better known as Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945, when the country was governed by the Nazi Party
under Adolf Hitler.
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there were approximately 46 million displaced persons in Eastern and Central Europe (Mazower,
1998). In many Eastern European countries such as Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland, there
were a series of post-war expulsions of ethnic Germans and politically persecuted individuals.
An average of 7 million ethnic Germans were expelled from these countries in 1948, or left due
to persecution, being the victims of hate crimes, or mistreatment (Mazower, 1998). Ethnic
Germans unlike most other migrants were given German citizenship and rights in accordance
with the Basic Law of the German Republic. Other refugees of non-German descent were
provided asylum under the Basic Law, but faced discrimination and were not given many of the
same privileges as the ethnic German migrants (Mazower, 1998).
Germany’s introduction of its Basic Law was evidently the result of the overall change
in Germany’s regime type to a more democratic structure and one where compliance with the
constitution was a primary principle. West Germany’s incorporation of international regulations
on refugee rights into asylum policy was based on the democratic values instilled by the Allies.
The most significant factor however, can be accredited to the agreements made at the 1951
United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. At the Convention,
several provisions and principles were established to create a more comprehensive guide to
international asylum rights and recognition (UNHCR). These principles were constructed by
defining what a refugee was, establishing how they should be recognized, the rights and
treatment they should have in the country they arrive to, as well as avoiding discriminating
against them or punishing them for having entered illegally (UNHCR). The most significant
provisions instilled during the convention were the right of refugees to seek asylum from
persecution in other countries, as well as the principle of non-refoulement. Non-refoulement is
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described as the practice against the return or expulsion of a refugee against their will to a nation
where they fear “threats to life or freedom” (UNHCR). As one of the signatories at the
convention these very same principles helped establish the German asylum policy as expressed
under Article 16 of the German Federal Republic’s Basic Law explicitly defining asylum as a
constitutional right.
Article 16 of the 1949 Basic Law for the Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland) aligned with the liberal values established at the 1951 Convention
and was the first of its kind in German history to establish the right to asylum. According to the
article that explains the inherent right, Article 16 (2), Sentence 2 states: ‘Persons persecuted on
political grounds should have the right to asylum’. Political persecution is defined “as
persecution that causes specific violations of individual rights and, due to its intensity, excludes
the individual from the ‘general peace framework’ of the state unit.” (Library of Congress,
2016). In other words, refugees were granted asylum in Germany if they could prove that they
faced political persecution and were thus not able to return to their country of origin. Whereas,
most other nations placed restrictions on refugee acceptance depending on whether or not an
asylum seeker was from a deemed ‘safe’ country of origin. However, with Germany’s asylum
status, refugees were able to receive the entitlements to refugee rights regardless of their country
of origin. This liberal principle stood as the main provision for asylum admissions in Germany
until the early 1990’s.
Although Germany was seen as being open to granting the right to asylum, German
nationals came to be less accepting of refugees and migrants after the first few decades of
German reconstruction. As an ethnically homogeneous nation, Germany had little to no
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permanent migrant settlement in Germany before 1945 (Monforte, 2014). This was mostly
because of the jus sanguinis or ‘right of blood’ approach to citizenship. Jus sanguinis citizenship
means that you must be of the same ethnic descent as the other citizens within the country that
you are attempting to get citizenship in (Rensmann, 2014). This stood as the main citizenship
principle in Germany until the late 1990’s. Therefore, citizenship rights for migrants were
limited to ethnic Germans. When it came to voting rights, only a small portion of refugees and
other migrants were eligible to vote as part of their constituency, and therefore had little to no
electoral influence (Rensmann, 2014). Along with limited rights to citizenship and voting
opportunities to migrants, and becoming a more nationalistic minded nation, migrants faced
discrimination and fell victim to hate crimes. These xenophobic acts on migrants and refugees
peaked in the early 1990’s and further enhanced the anti-migrant sentiments among the public,
highlighted the prominence of the issue and led to public demand that the German political
parties take a stance on the issue. An example of violence towards refugees is reported in the
Human Rights Watch Report, where right-wing extremists delivered violent attacks on a refugee
shelter in the city of Rostock for the length of two days (1992). This caused the refugees housed
there to evacuate as the extremist groups attempted to attack the inhabitants and even threw
incendiary weapons such as petrol bombs at the building (Human Rights Watch 1992). Although
these violent attacks on migrants and refugees throughout Germany were uncommon
occurrences conducted mainly by nationalist groups, the events that took place in Rostock
sparked a parliamentary investigation in response to the overwhelming violence that occurred
there (Human Rights Watch 1992). In 1991, there were a total number of 3,884 crimes carried
out against immigrants by right-wing nationals, this number rose to a remarkable 7,121 in 1992
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and to 10,561 in 1993 (Human Rights Watch 1995). As a result of the German public’s
sentiments towards migrants, and ongoing violence fueled by the inflows of almost half a million
asylum seekers that same year, the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) took the platform of
standing up for a restrictive reform on asylum acceptance policy to help control the peaking
number of migrants (Rensmann, 2014). The CDU also went as far as blaming the SPD party for
not accepting the reform that had been previously proposed multiple times.
Throughout the stages of WWII reconstruction in Germany, guest workers, refugees and
immigrants were widely accepted and sought after as cheap labor (Mazower, 1998). From 1945
to 1950, the inflows of refugees from Eastern and Central Europe and Eastern Germany to
Western Germany reached their peak. By the 1960’s European countries such as France,
Germany, and Switzerland competed for labor and established guest worker systems due to the
decline in European immigration and refugee inflows (Mazower, 1998). The reduction in asylum
applications throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s contributed to the liberal qualities of German
asylum policy and highlighted the need for migrant labor. After the rise of the Berlin Wall in
1961, East German immigrants were not legally allowed to cross over to West Germany and
therefore, contributed to the decline in the German labor force. This placed more pressure on
West Germany to establish a greater economic reliance on non-ethnic German migrants and
migrant workers to contribute to the German labor force (Geddes, 2003). Migrant workers and
refugees were being sought to provide cheap labor, as a result of not only reconstruction and a
decrease in the refugee and migrant inflows, but also the rise in the newly established capitalistic
and industrial values (Mazower, 1998). These values were driven by the rise in market economy
principles instilled by western influences and the need for expeditious economic growth. The
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assistance provided by the Marshall Plan- the financial plan instilled by the United States to
provide assistance to Western Europe, also helped drive the growth and expansion of the
Western German economy.
However, throughout the 1970s and 1980s economic decline throughout Europe and in
Germany particularly, led to an adverse effect. The economic pressures brought on by inflation, a
steep decline in the economic growth rate, unemployment and the overabundance of guest
workers led to a public perception of competition between migrants and nationals for jobs
(Gibney 2004). In October of 1973, Egypt and Syria’s attack on Israel led to the announcement
of the reduction of oil production as well as an increase in oil prices to more than double what
they had been at the beginning of 1973 (Sargent 2013). The acceleration and tightening of
refugee admission procedures at local and states levels where the economic and social pressures
of reacting to refugee inflows were felt, were highly debated at local and Federal levels of
German government alike (Poutrus, 2014). Social discontent further enhanced the pressures to
reform the West Germany’s ‘open’ refugee policy. This became more evident as the number of
foreign workers in Germany alone reached a total of 2.8 million by 1973.
To further highlight the negative effects of liberal asylum policy, the Christian
Democratic Party of Germany (CDU) stood on a more nationalistic platform that may have
helped to encourage the plurality of the German public to take a stance against permissive
asylum policies. The CDU of West Germany came to power after the 1949 elections and
remained in power throughout the 1950’s; it had a moderately conservative appeal to the
majority of the German electorate (Mazower, 1998). The Social Democratic Party (SPD) became
their main opponent and dominated the left side of the political party spectrum. This was partly
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caused by the ban on communist and political parties that were extremely to the left. In 1956 the
German Constitution created this ban as a way to prevent the tainted events of the recent past
from repeating themselves1 (Judt, 2005). However, they were not able to secure the plurality of
the voter support throughout the 1950s. After the reform of the party’s socialist values, their
electorate support improved in the 1961 and 1965 elections. The 1969 Federal elections were
successful for the Social SPD party as they won the plurality of votes and parliamentary seats in
the parliamentary election and became the true opposition of the CDU. The SPD party gained
true recognition throughout the 1970s, as Willy Brandt, the party leader from 1969 to 1974
played the main role of repairing relations between the two Germanys and reaffirming unity
between the German people by conducting the negotiations of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties
of 1970 (Mazower, 1998). These treaties established the recognition of the German boarders and
frontiers, as well as establishing encouraging cross boarder movements between the two
Germanys.
The CDU played a crucial role in pressuring the SPD to reform refugee procedures and
cease from supporting the current liberal asylum policy that stood by the welcoming of refugees
with open arms. After a great deal of debate and significant pressure placed by Conservative
parties, the German parliament passed a 1980 amendment that accelerated the asylum
determination procedure (Mazower, 1998). These new procedures helped to restrict asylum
decision appeals and facilitated expulsions of refugees who were in Germany for economic
reasons. The culmination of legislative procedures to help reduce the high numbers of asylum
and migrant inflows came to the point where 17 new legislative reforms on asylum came to be
after the CDU seized power in 1982 (Mazower, 1998). The 1984 and 1987 election campaigns
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were used as a platform for the Conservative parties to further reiterate and highlight their
negative views of German openness towards asylum; they argued that refugees and migrants
were mostly criminals who were looking to benefit from and take advantage of the German
economy and welfare state (Monfrote, 2006). Although German reunification is accredited to
Helmut Kohl, the 1990 CDU candidate who ran on a German reunification ticket, had an
immigration platform much less accepting of refugees than past chancellors, the majority of
which established platforms under the SPD. After winning the plurality in Eastern Germany and
the majority of Eastern Germans voting for the passing of German reunification policies, the
treaty of unification was passed on August 23, 1990 joining East and West Germany together
once again and further establishing the CDU’s position as Germany’s favored majority party.
Chancellor Kohl’s CDU and CSU held office from 1982-1998 and retained the “political strategy
and policy of “no immigration,” no road to citizenship, and “no recognition” of visible
minorities” (Rensmann, 2014).
These anti-migrant perspectives were encouraged by the inflows of refugees caused by
the fall of the iron curtain. Towards the end of the 1980’s and early 1990’s, migrant and refugee
inflows increased significantly as the Cold War came to an end in 1989 after Mikhail Gorbachev
came into power and established the reforming principles of glasnost (openness) and perestroika
(restructuring) (Mazower, 1998). This marked the dissolution of the Soviet Union and initiating
the migration of millions of ethnic Germans and other displaced persons from what was the
Eastern Bloc, to Western European countries, mainly Germany. The early 1990s’ violent attacks,
xenophobia, and discrimination against refugees and other migrants increased, as the rise in
migrant inflows caused apprehension among the German public. The main concerns came from

20

an economic standpoint, as the public viewed migrants as the main source of economic decline
because of their dependency on the welfare state and the perception that migrants were taking the
jobs of German nationals. Another factor that played into the German public opposition of
accepting migrants were the effects of the fall of the Iron Curtain and reunification of East and
Western Germany. Western Germany was in the midst of accepting refugees from Eastern
European nations as well as taking in many Eastern German nationals and assisting in the
rebuilding of Eastern Germany’s economy and social stability.
In November of 1992, the governing parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
Christian Social Union (CSU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the main opposition party,
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) agreed on the 1992 amendment of Article 16 of Germany’s
Basic Law on asylum (Fijalkowski, 1993). The amendment allowed for the expulsion of refugees
back to the safe third country to which they first arrived, whereas before, asylum was granted
regardless of their country of origin; it was unlawful to send a refugee back to where they came
from. The implementation of a newly strict, yet cohesive deportation system enabled authorities
to immediately reject the asylum claims falsely claiming persecution (Gibney, 2004). This
allowed less room for refugees to be admitted or stay illegally. After this amendment,
Conservative values helped shape German asylum policy and controlled the admittance of
refugees.
The EU also played a major role in creating restrictions to German asylum policies as a
response to the Schengen and Dublin Agreements. The Schengen Agreement signed in 1985 and
implemented in 1990, specifies that signatories would be part of an area of free movement with
one single external border in place of internal borders (EC Europa, 2016). This enabled the
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citizens of these signatory nations to be entitled to the freedom of movement across other
signatory nations in the EU. Four hundred million citizens, as well as other individuals who were
visiting or traveling in the EU were now able to cross national boarders without the limitation of
providing some form of travel permit or having to go through border checks (EC Europa, 2016).
All states under the Schengen Agreement are bound to following the rules and regulations of
compliance with the pre-determined conditions of helping protect one’s borders as well as those
of other Schengen nations, and work together with the other nation’s border patrol and law
enforcement authorities. One of the downsides to this agreement had to do with the security
measures that had to be taken. As all nations participating in Schengen agreed to the overall
terms, this meant that some nations were legally bound to increase their border security, and
immigration and asylum policies in order to protect their borders from further insurgence and
massive inflows (Bosche, 2006). One of these nations was Germany. As one of the most
powerful and economically successful EU nations, the concern with illegal immigrants and
refugees being able to more easily gain access to Germany by passing through other Schengen
nations, was a daunting yet realistic concern. For this reason, asylum, immigration, and border
control procedures were all made more restrictive in the years following the agreement which
helped to reduce the number of asylum applications in Germany (Piotrowicz, 1998).
The Dublin Regulation was originally established at the Dublin Convention in 1990
where EU states signed an agreement that helped to specify the responsibilities of each nation
when it came to asylum intake. According to the policy, the first EU nation that a refugee arrives
to is responsible for processing their application (EPRS, 2016). EU member states such as
Germany, were relieved, as refugees that potentially planned on cutting through other EU nations
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in order to take advantage of Germany’s liberal asylum policies, were now forced by law to
apply for asylum in the country where they first arrived. Therefore, this was yet another
restriction on German asylum admissions.
The Schengen and Dublin agreements were seen by Germany as an opportunity to “seal
themselves off” from the inflows of refugees that passed through other EU nations first, as they
would have to apply for asylum in the first EU nation they arrived to (Gibney, 2004). Countries
such as Greece, Italy, Hungary, and France are considered countries of first arrival due to their
location on their proximity to refugee source countries. Migrants and refugees were now more
likely to apply for asylum in these first arrival countries than in Germany.
Aside from the more obvious and inherent effects that being a member of the EU had on
German asylum policy, it is necessary to also consider the responsibility that came with being a
member of the EU. As a cooperative union of European states, factors such as migrant inflows
and economic instability that occur in one state, can also affect the other member states, as their
economies and supranational agreements link them together. The Schengen and Dublin
agreements helped to restrict asylum admissions policy, and reduce the number of refugee
inflows. Germany, being one among the member states, needed to adhere to the EU’s standards
by maintaining a stabilized population growth and economy as EU states became more
interconnected. Therefore, Germany’s political parties agreed to restrict their asylum acceptance
policy in order to have more control over their national economy and population growth, as well
as that of the EU’s (Bosche, 2006). Also, the EU’s Dublin Agreement did not align with
Germany’s constitutional right to asylum until after the 1992 constitutional amendment on
asylum. Before the amendment, the provisions of the Dublin agreement did not coincide with
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Germany’s constitutional right to asylum and prevented Germany from fully taking advantage of
the EU-level asylum policies (Bosche, 2006). This misalignment provided yet another reason to
amend Article 16.

Chapter 3: Factors Contributing to Policy Change
3.1 Migrant inflows and Economic Pressures
In this section I examine how the convergence of several factors, including migrant
inflows and increases in asylum applications in Germany, economic pressures resulting from the
global economic decline after the 1973 Oil Crisis, the end of the Cold War, and German
reunification, contributed to the German public’s sentiment towards migrants and refugees.
Guest workers and migrants had been welcomed and sought after as a source of labor for
the economic expansion throughout the post-WWII era in Western Germany. However, the
global economic difficulties in the mid-1970s following the Oil Crisis sparked inflation and
economic downfall throughout Europe and diminished the need for the external workforce.
Along with the economic downturn, inflows of migrants began to increase significantly in the
1980s and early 1990s when the fall of the Iron Curtain caused millions of Eastern Europeans to
become displaced or interested in beginning a new life in Western Europe. In 1992, three years
after the end of the cold and German reunification, Germany received about half of all refugees
in Europe and became one of the most popular destination countries for asylum seekers
(Bosswick, 2000). Its reunification with Eastern Germany had major effects on West German
immigration as East Germans and other Eastern Europeans sought asylum in Germany, as well
as its economy that now had to be restructured in order to temporarily support Eastern Germany.
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Migrant Inflows
As Table 1 shows, in 1980, Germany received a total of 107,818 asylum applications.
From the late 1970s until the early 1980s, asylum policy reform became one of the main
priorities among German political parties. I will describe the specifics of the party tactics later in
this chapter. The result of such a large number of refugee applications in 1980 led to the
implementation of a new Asylum Procedure Code in 1982 (Bosswick, 2000). As asylum
application numbers dropped in 1981-1984, demands for further asylum policy restrictions were
not as prominently displayed among the German public or as part of political party platforms.
However, the topic came to the fore once again, when asylum applications were substantially
increased to 73,832 in 1985, and 99,650 in 1986 (Table 1). As a result of the recommencement
of significantly high numbers of asylum applications, an amendment to the Asylum Procedures
Code of 1982 was made in 1987 which made it easier to deny asylum to refugees who had
previously stayed in a safe third country for at least 3 months before applying for asylum in
Germany. The restriction’s effects can be seen with the significant decrease in asylum
applications in 1987 to 57,379, compared to the rise in applications that occurred in 1985 and
1986 (Table 1). This suggests a strong correlation between the rise in asylum application
numbers and the spotlight that is placed on asylum policy restriction by legislators and political
parties.
These asylum procedures were only temporary fixes to the issue of migrant inflows that
resurfaced in 1988 until 1992, when asylum applications peaked. At the end of the Cold War in
1988, asylum applications rose significantly to 103,076, and 121,315 in 1989, as Eastern
European borders opened with the fall of the Iron Curtain. By 1992, 438,200 refugees sought
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asylum in Germany alone (UNHCR, 2001). This was without a doubt a crisis that surprised and
intimidated German Constituents as they feared their welfare system and job market would be
impacted negatively by migrants, specifically, asylum seekers.

Table 1
Annual Number of New Asylum Cases in Germany (1980-1992)
Year
Asylum
Applications

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

107,818

49,391

37,423

19,737

35,278

73,832

99,650

57,379

103,076

121,315

193,063

256,112

438,191

Table 1:Total Annual Number of Asylum Applications in Germany. OECD International Migration Outlook, Special Focus:
Managing the Labour Migration Beyond the Crisis (Paris: OECD, 2009)

The economic pressures that were felt as a result of the Oil Crisis of 1973, the fall of the
Iron Curtain, the reunification of Western and Eastern Germany, and most importantly for the
purposes of this study, the inflows of migrants and refugees, played a crucial role in pressuring
the German public and then the German government to restrict asylum admissions policy.
Throughout the Post-WWII era of the 1950s and 1960s, the German economy was being rebuilt
and relied heavily on the labor of migrants, refugees, and guest workers for growth. Germany
went as far as setting up guest worker programs where workers from other nations such as Italy,
Yugoslavia and Turkey were invited to work in Germany (Judt, 2005). The guest worker, or
Gastarbeiter as they were called, were provided with limited social and economic rights
compared to German nationals, as they were perceived to be temporary workers. From 19601965, a total net number of migrants was 66,700, and a total of 91,800 migrants came to
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Germany from 1970-1975 (MPI, 2016). However, not only were the numbers of migrants
increasing significantly when comparing the 1960s to the 1970s in Germany, but several
economic issues created even more tension among German nationals and migrants, especially
when it came to high unemployment rates and debates about who should have access to welfare.

Economic Pressures
Following WWII, Germany received aid from the Allies to help restructure its economy
and established a stable economic infrastructure. Along with the labor provided by guest workers
and migrants, the German economy was back on its feet by the mid 1950s. The economy
remained steady throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and rose significantly in the early 1970s.
However, by 1975, the annual percent of GDP growth rate for Germany and the EU as a whole,
plummeted, as seen in Figure 1. The severe decline in GDP annual growth percentage is
attributed to the increase in inflation and a decline in Germany’s economic growth rate. Due to
these declining domestic economic conditions, feelings towards refugees and migrants overall
became more negative throughout Western Germany. After the fall of the Iron Curtain and
reunification with Eastern Germany, the declining economic conditions in Germany became
even more strained because of the increase of migrants from Eastern Europe as well as Western
Germany’s need to help repair the East German economy in order to bring it up to the same level
as West Germany and enhance the unification process (Grabka et al. 1999).
Nineteen ninety was a significant year for the German economy as a whole. Not only was
West Germany suffering economically from providing aid to and establishing a common market
economy with the newly reunified Eastern Germany, but droves of Eastern European immigrants
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and Eastern Germans migrated to Western Germany to find employment and more economically
stable lives as unemployment rates rose throughout the Eastern bloc. The East German transition
from the socialist economy to the Market economy’s Deutsch Mark was known as having been a
form of ‘Shock Therapy’ given to East Germany as part of its economic restructuring. The
‘Shock Therapy’ as it was called, was felt by both East and West Germany, and caused further
resentment among German nationals towards migrants and refugees (Grabka et al. 1999).
German nationals now had to compete for jobs with migrants from Eastern Germany and Eastern
Europe as result of the rising unemployment rates of 18% in East Germany and 10% in West
Germany (Grabka et al. 1999). Income inequality was yet another issue in reunified Germany
that was thought to have been increased by the movement of migrants, however, the overall
German economic inequality was actually lowered by migrant movements, as described in
Grabka’s 1999 study on the German income distribution. The income inequality along with high
unemployment rates were more directly caused by the rise in economic tensions after
reunification.
Piotrowicz (1998) argues that these economic costs placed a significant burden on West
Germany to maintain a stable economy. Providing financial assistance to East Germany while
attempting to receive an influx of refugees and sustain the welfare state placed significant
economic pressures on both East and West German regions. German nationals were driven to
believe that the once economically necessary migrant workers and refugees, were now just a
mere burden on their economy after the economic downturn in the face of the 1973 Oil Crisis,
inflation, increased rates of unemployment, and reunification struggles. Monfrote (2004) argues
that the 1990 legislative elections were known as the ‘asylum campaign’ due to the constant
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candidate debate on asylum policy. These debates caused media campaigns that encouraged the
public to believe that refugees were ‘smugglers’ who were endangering the German welfare state
and economy. In the next section, I will review the public opinion in Germany, as well as
describe opposition towards migrants and refugees as expressed through hate crimes and
xenophobic acts.
Figure 1

German Annual % GDP Growth (1971-1992)
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Figure 1: Germany Annual GDP % Growth. World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Germany Annual % GDP Growth (1960-1992).

3.2 Public Opinion and the Opposition towards Migrants and Refugees
In this section I discuss German public opinion results presented in Eurobarometer
surveys from 1974 to 1992, as well as instances and statistical evidence of violent attacks
conducted by neo-Nazi and nationalist groups on migrants and refugees throughout the early
1990’s in order to show the correlation between the migrant inflows and economic instability,
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and the German public’s sentiments toward refugees, migrants, the right to asylum, and the
country’s economic standing. The results of the Eurobarometer surveys show that the state of the
economy, high unemployment rates, and income inequality were constantly rated among the
most important issues during this time by German nationals. Also, the right to asylum was
ranked the lowest among Germans when asked about the rights and liberties of man that should
always be respected (Eurobarometer, 1989). A majority answered in the affirmative when asked
whether or not asylum policy reform was needed at the national level in order to control refugee
inflows (Eurobarometer, 1992). The majority of Germans surveyed in 1990 stated that they
thought there were too many non-EC nationals in Germany and that joint EC decision making
was necessary in the area of political asylum (Eurobaromter, 1990). The increase in violent
attacks and hate crimes carried out by neo-Nazi and nationalist groups from 1991 until 1993, as
presented by the 1995 Human Rights Watch report, demonstrate that a small section of the
German public reacted negatively to the influx of migrant inflows during the early 1990’s and
appears to have brought greater national attention to the area of refugee admissions policy
(Human Rights Watch, 1995).

Violence and Opposition
Along with Germany’s changing public attitudes towards migrants and refugees
throughout the Cold War era and after reunification due to the large influxes in inflows, there
were more evident signs that a portion of the German public showed strong opposition towards
migrants. Hate crimes and xenophobic actions geared towards refugees and other migrants
increased significantly throughout this period, particularly when large influxes of refugees were
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seen in the early 1990’s (Human Rights Watch, 1992). These anti-immigrant and anti-refugee
sentiments were attributed to the fear and sometimes even hatred that was most likely felt by
German nationalist groups, as they stood against migrants perceived as gaining German welfare
rights and competing for jobs with ethnic Germans and German nationals. Although the majority
of the German public stood against hate crimes towards migrants and refugees, nationalist and
radically rightist groups caught national attention and seem to have brought more awareness to
refugee admission reforms. A report conducted by the Migration Policy Institute concluded that
75% of Germans surveyed in 1992 thought that there were too many immigrants living in
Germany (Abali, 2009). The main reasons behind the discontent with migrants are described by
Gibney (2004), who focused on highlighting the effects of immigrant inflows on the public’s
negative perception of refugees. According to Gibney, the emergence of refugees that were so
ethnically and culturally distinct from the majority of the German population, as well as the
evident contempt that most economically depressed Eastern German Länders felt, caused a great
deal of anti-refugee and anti-immigrant violence and sentiments among the German public (p.
96).
Piotrowicz (1998), described the extreme racial tensions that arose between German
nationals and refugees among other immigrants in 1992. According to Piotrowicz, racial and
xenophobic attacks against refugees were “daily occurrences.” The segregation of refugees from
the rest of the German population, by placing them in separate housing facilities located in less
favorable areas of town, can be viewed as a representation of the xenophobia that arose, and
created a greater amount of separation and anti-migrant sentiment as refugees were constantly
viewed as outsiders.
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Examples of xenophobic and racially fueled actions towards migrants were compiled by
the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Report and recorded in the book “Germany for Germans”
(1995). As noted in the literature, right-wing and neo-Nazi groups grew significantly in the
nineteen nineties. Thirty neo-Nazi groups and forty right-wing organizations were active in
Germany, as reported by the German Government in 1991 with a total membership of 39,800. In
1992 these numbers increased to thirty-three neo-Nazi groups and forty-nine right-wing groups,
increasing the overall membership of extremists to 41,900 (Human Rights Watch, 1995). As far
as describing the types of targeted acts towards migrants and foreigners conducted by these
groups, the racist ideologies shared by the group members encouraged them to wage verbal and
as well as physical acts of violence. In 1991 the total number of crimes carried out against
immigrants by right-wing nationals totaled 3,884, rose to a remarkable 7,121 in 1992 and to
10,561 in 1993 (Human Rights Watch, 1995). However, violent crimes targeted towards
foreigners slightly decreased in the period between 1992 and 1993. By 1994, violent right-wing
crimes decreased to 1,233. Violence and xenophobic acts varied greatly among the different
regions, as well as between West and East Germany. It is reported that Western German states
were responsible for the majority of xenophobic violent crimes in 1992, as East Germany held
significantly lower anti-migrant crime rates because the ratio of ‘foreigners to Germans’ was not
as high as in Western Germany as it was in Eastern Germany (Helsinki Watch 1992).
There are several examples of such violence throughout Germany, there are several that
hold the most significance because of the casualties that resulted from them. On May 29, 1993 in
Solingen Germany, the Genc family of Turkish origin were killed in a home fire that was thought
to have been started by right-wing extremists, as authorities found swastikas freshly scratched
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into the dirt and outside of their building (Human Rights Watch). The year before, two Turkish
apartment buildings were firebombed, killing three people. The fire department was called to
report the event by some stating “Heil Hitler.” Police responses to such attacks were varied
depending on the structure of the local governance and police networks. Most police responses
lacked in effectiveness and swiftness when it came to answering to calls regarding attacks on
refugees and migrants. However, West German authorities were generally quicker and more
effective at responding to such attacks. An example of this is seen when neo-Nazis in Magdeburg
sought to attack foreigners in May of 1994. Five African refugees were targeted. They were
beaten and stabbed and had to seek refuge in a foreigner-owned café while waiting for the police
to arrive. It was reported that it took over half an hour for authorities to arrive at the scene
(Human Rights Watch, 1995). Although several organizations were disbanded by the German
government due to their violence and other hate-fueled actions, anti-immigrant sentiments
remained whether these groups were discredited or not.
A 1993 New York Times Article by Papamarkos outlines the common German
population’s sentiments towards the violence and discrimination that migrants and foreigners in
their country faced on an almost daily basis. Most of the individuals interviewed stated that the
majority of the German population stands against these horrific acts against foreigners. However,
there still needs to be more done, not only to control the ‘skinheads’ who usually carry out these
types of attacks, but to also fix the ‘relaxed’ German asylum system in order to control migrant
inflows, reduce the number of attacks, and help establish a better life for foreigners already
living in Germany. The article also mentions that numerous demonstrations by pro-migrant
Germans were coordinated in order to raise awareness of the maltreatment of foreigners and
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contribute to putting an end to the targeted violence. An example given is that of a first division
professional German soccer club sporting jerseys that read "My best friend is a foreigner” during
the last game of their 1992 season (Papamarkos, 1993). Like this peaceful, yet effective
demonstration, many others sprung up throughout 1992 as a mission to end the abuse of
foreigners and as a response to the increase in brutalities inflicted on foreigners, particularly
refugees, that same year. As written by another New York Times reporter in 1992, nearly
350,000 Germans came together at the German capital to protest the ongoing violence against
migrants, refugees, and other foreigners. Important political figures such as German President
Richard von Weizsacker and Chancellor Helmut Kohl spoke at this historical event and were
both met with contempt from neo-Nazi groups (Whitney, 1992).

Public opinion results
Public opinion polls help to identify the attitudes of German nationals towards the
migrant population throughout this period of time. One of the most well-known and widely used
polling systems in Europe since 1973 for recording public opinion overall, and specifically
within the EU nations is the Eurobarometer. The polling results from the Eurobarometer will be
used in this thesis in order to compare the German public’s attitudes toward migrants from the
mid 1970’s through the early 1990’s. The context of the questions asked in each year’s
Eurobarometer survey vary. However, the ones reported here are used to help associate public
sentiment toward foreigners, migrants, and refugees with the public’s view on other national
issues such as unemployment and the state of the economy. Eurobarometer surveys are
conducted at each EC/EU nation. Thus public opinion in Germany can be compared to that of
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other EU members. I examine how migrant inflows and economic factors may have affected
public opinion. I expect to find that public opinion played a crucial role in influencing the
German political party agendas to look more closely at asylum policy restrictions and eventually
leading to the change in the constitutional asylum admissions policy.
The 1974 Eurobarometer results show that all EC nationals saw inflation as the most
significant issue in Europe at the time. This was a result of the European economy’s recession
after the oil crisis in 1973 and rising inflation rates among Germany and other EU nations. The
countries where most nationals expressed fear and concern over the high unemployment rates
within their nation were the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark (Eurobarometer 1974). By the
time the 1980 Eurobarometer polls were conducted, the majority of EC nationals asked how well
off their country was economically, compared to other member states, most felt as though their
country was worse off compared to others, especially when it came to work, wages and industry
development. Wage and income levels, as well as dynamic industries were ranked the highest
among top disparities by German nationals. This signified that the economic downturn
throughout the mid and late 1970s continued to have negative effects on Germans’ economy
perceptions of economic performance in the early 1980s (Eurobarometer, 1980).
The 1989 Eurobarometer’s special edition report focused on measurements of racism and
xenophobia across EC nations. The report began with the EC’s Declaration against Racism and
Xenophobia introduced in 1986. This declaration outlines the following principles; the
recognition of xenophobic attitudes and actions against immigrants, and the member states’
objective of working towards the elimination of racial discrimination. The agreements made
among EC nations were on condemning intolerance, hostility and force against groups based on
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race, religion and cultural differences, working towards ending segregation, and awareness of
indecency, xenophobia, and racism. This report was published in the midst of xenophobic attacks
across Europe and also throughout West Germany’s Länder. When asked which was the most
important issue that their nation currently faced, German citizens ranked unemployment as the
most important, suggesting that the economy and unemployment rates were still a major concern.
When EC community citizens were asked of their approval of racist movements, approved of
racist and anti-racist movements, the majority said that they disapproved of racist movements but
did not approve or strongly approve of antiracist movements. However, liberty and equality
among citizens were considered to be equally important. When EC nationals were asked which
rights and liberties of man should always be respected under all circumstances, the majority
chose the right of asylum (51%) while the second most popular response was that the right to
asylum ‘depends’ on the situation (42%). When German citizens were asked the same question,
the majority of Germans responded by answering that equality (94%) and privacy (93%) should
always be respected. The right to asylum was ranked the lowest with a support of 38%. This
demonstrates that the German public ranked all other rights of man higher than the right to
asylum. This could be because when this poll was conducted in the late 1980’s, the number of
asylum seekers and other migrants began to rise once again, fueling the German public’s
aversion towards their permissive policy on granting asylum.
When Germans were asked which nationalities first came to mind when asked about
people from other nationalities, they responded: Turks (63%), Southern Europeans (26%), and
Eastern Europeans (16%) as ‘others.’ Turks were first to come to mind when asked about people
from another culture, as they were seen as the most culturally and ethnically distinct members of
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German communities. When asked what came to mind when thinking about people from other
races, 73% of respondents said that Muslims came to mind. When asked whether or not they
thought that there were too many people from other nations in Germany, 50% of Germans
responded in the affirmative. To the question of whether they would like to see the rights of nonEEC nationals improved, maintained, or restricted, 56% responded that rights should be
restricted and that the right to asylum ‘depends.’ When Germans were asked about supporting
legislation to further control the inflows of foreigners, the majority of Germans answered by
saying that their constitution needed to change in order to control the inflows, or that EEC action
needed to be taken to control or restrict the migration. The main attitudes recorded in Germany
about the place of ‘others’ in their society showed that the majority held conservative attitudes
towards tolerance and the granting of asylum rights (Eurobarometer, 1989).
In 1990 the Eurobarometer survey asked which social policy areas should be regulated at
the EC level, and the lowest support was shown for social rights for people from non-member
countries at 62% compared to other social policy areas that received 80 to 90% of the vote. Fiftyseven percent of Germans said that the adoption of a community charter for fundamental social
rights would be a good thing, while the respective percentage in other EU nations ranged from
70 to 80%. This shows that the majority of Germans felt that EC level of support regarding social
policy would be favorable, however, a portion of German respondents still held a more
conservative standpoint, and wanted to keep social policy areas within their national realm and
reserve social rights for nationals, not migrants coming from non-member countries. According
to the results of a 1989 flash poll in the 1989 Eurobarometer report 78% of Germans said they
favored reunification; they were also asked whether or not they agreed with East Germany
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joining the EC, and 68% agreed. However, when asked if Central and Eastern Europeans should
also be allowed to join the community, only 57% of Germans agreed. This demonstrates that
Germans felt closer ties to East Germans and would prefer them as EC members than the more
culturally, ethnically, and nationally distinct Eastern and Central Europeans. Lastly, when
Germans were asked about what all Germans had in common, economic success (14%) was
ranked among the lowest, showing the pessimism regarding the German economic state and
income inequality.
As reported in the 1991 Eurobarometer results, when Germans were asked how they felt
about immigrants who were not nationals of the EC countries, 58% of West Germans and 45%
of East Germans said there were ‘too many.’ The results here correlate with the rise in asylum
applications at the end of the Cold War from 1988 to 1992, as well as a rise in migration to
Germany from Eastern Europe. Evidently, Germans were feeling the pressures of migrant
inflows. When Germans were asked what should be done about people from different countries
south of the Mediterranean who want to work in the EC, 61% of Western and Eastern Germans
said that restrictions were needed. Twenty-five percent said that they should not be accepted at
all, and only 11% said that they should be accepted without restrictions. When Germans were
asked the same question about Eastern European workers, 62% of Western Germans and 64% of
Eastern Germans said that restrictions were needed, 26% of Western Germans and 23% of East
Germans said not to accept them at all. The same question was asked about asylum seekers who
sought entry due to humanitarian rights violations, and 54% of Western Germans and 53% of
Eastern Germans said that restrictions would be needed, while 27% of Western Germans and
11% of Eastern Germans said not to accept them. This also suggests the overall German mindset
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that further restrictions were needed to help vet or deny potential entry to immigrants and asylum
seekers, as well as to guest workers as a result of high unemployment rates and increasing
migrant inflows. Unemployment was a large issue that faced the EC, as 79% of EC citizens said
that fighting unemployment was the most important of all political problems. In Germany
specifically, the fight against unemployment was also a significant national issue as 69% of West
Germans and 87% of East Germans said that it was ‘very important.’ When it came to asking
Germans about whether or not the rights of EC nationals should be extended to those who are
not, but still live in Germany, most East and Western Germans said that rights should either be
restricted of left as is. Only 12% of West Germans and 14% of East Germans said that the rights
should be extended. The majority of Eastern and Western Germans agreed that non-EC nationals
should not have the same rights as German nationals or that they should be restricted. This
appears to be the result of the increase in refugees and Eastern European migrants that occurred
in the early 90’s as well as the economic struggle ensued the merging of the Eastern German
economy with West Germany’s, and again, dealing with inflation rates and income inequality.
Evidently, German nationals felt an aversion to extending social rights such as welfare assistance
and allowing migrant workers and asylum seekers to compete for jobs with German nationals.
Results from the 1992 Eurobarometer show that the main fears among German nationals
were having too many immigrants, higher crime rates, and having to pay for others. The German
population was fearful about: too much immigration (44%), opening borders to drugs and crime
(43%) and having to pay for others (42%) (Eurobarometer, 1992). Also, 56% of Germans said
that they predicted the economy would get worse in the year to come. When it came to asking
about joint EC decision making, political asylum (59%), foreign policy (59%), and immigration
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policy (71%) all were ranked highly among EC citizens. This demonstrates that almost half of
the German population feared the continuous growth of immigration to their country and seemed
to correlate with the fear that migrant inflows would make their borders more open to the
transportation of drugs and criminal activity and that by becoming more integrated with the EC’s
policymaking in the areas of foreign, immigration, and asylum policy, it would provide greater
national security. We can also see that almost half of the Germans polled were fearful about
having to pay for others, and this seems to be correlated with the majority’s prediction of the
economy becoming worse within the next year as well as the rise in migrants that could have
increased fears about having to pay for their welfare and government funded housing. The
German public’s negative view of their economic standing as a nation continued to be the most
constant national view demonstrated in the Eurobarometer survey results throughout the mid1970’s and early 1990’s. The majority of Germans polled agreed with joint EC decision making
in the areas of political asylum, foreign policy, and immigration policy. This can be viewed as
not only the German public’s fondness for becoming more immersed in the EC community, but
more importantly it demonstrates the German public’s sense that their national government is not
taking the steps necessary to control these external forces, and thus viewing that supranational
decision making as the most effective in creating the correct policies in these areas.

3.3 Electoral Pressures on German Political Parties
The violent attacks targeting refugees, the growth of anti-immigrant political parties, and
Constituents among the Länder requesting to further restrict asylum provisions heightened
tensions among the public and political sectors (Gibney, 2004). According to Geddes in 1991,
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76% of the German public agreed that an amendment to Article 16 was needed (2003). In this
section I will describe how the constituency’s electoral pressures on the main German political
parties encouraged the change of asylum policy from liberal to restrictive in 1992.

Electoral Patterns
Although the right of center Christian Democratic Party (CDU) proposed an amendment
to Article 16, first in 1988 and again in 1991, it was rejected by the Social Democratic Party
(SPD), who at the time held the plurality of the seats in both the Bundestrat and Bundestag- the
two legislative bodies in the German federal government. Bosswick (2000) states that the
proposals made by Conservative parties, including the CDU on the amendment of the basic law,
was not able to be passed because of the opposition of the Social Democratic party and most
other leftist parties refusing to agree with amending the policy. In order to pass an amendment, a
two-thirds majority vote was needed from both legislative houses, thus making it difficult to get
past the SPD dominated Bundestag. For this reason, studying the federal elections and the
campaign strategies that took place throughout this time period (1978-1990) are crucial to
discovering whether or not the electoral pressures from voters contributed to the parties’
platform, the changes they made to their campaign strategies while competing for the majority of
seats in the Bundestag, and ultimately their decision to restrict asylum policy.
The German Bundestag is the main legislative body of the government. The Bundestag
election results throughout the 1970s, until the 1990s showed stronger support for the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) than its main opponent, the Christian Democratic Party (CDU). The
Social Democrats are known for their more leftist, social democratic platform on social and
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economic issues and the Christian Democrats for their conservative, right-leaning platform. The
CDU was the dominant party in federal elections throughout the 1950s and 1960s by constantly
winning the plurality of the vote, however, after the 1969 federal elections, the SPD secured the
plurality of vote by restructuring their platform and were able to retain the plurality of the votes
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as seen in Table 2. In the 1972 German Bundestag elections,
the votes cast totaled 37,761,589. Of those, 13,190,837 (35.2%) went to the CDU winning them
36% of seats, and 17,175,169 (45.8%) went to the SPD, securing the plurality of seats (46%) for
their party. The results of the 1976 elections showed that the SPD continued to lead with its
plurality of 16,099,019 (47.6%) votes and 43% of seats compared to the CDU that received
14,367,302 (38%) votes and 38% of seats. Throughout the 1970s, the SPD was able to secure a
plurality of votes because of its strong leftist economic policy position. The leftist position is one
that aligns with the economic concerns of the lower and middle working class constituents, as it
encourages government intervention in the economy (mixed economy) and emphasizes the
importance of the welfare state. Therefore, the popularity of the SPD party during this time
period is attributed to the constituency’s alignment with leftist economic values that were
intended to help lift Germany from its recession and improve employment rates. However, by
1983, the margin between the two leading parties began to narrow as the SPD secured
14,865,807 (38.2%) votes and 39% of seats, and the CDU received 14,857,680 (38.1%) of the
votes and 38% of seats. The SPD won the plurality of votes and seats once again in 1987,
however, the margin was still quite small, with the SPD receiving 14,025,763 (37%) of votes and
37% of seats, and, the CDU following behind with 13,045,745 (34.4%) of the votes and 35% of
seats. The most significant change took place during the nineteen-ninety Bundestag elections
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when the CDU reclaimed its plurality of votes and seats with 17,055,116 (36.7%) of votes and
40% of seats, compared to the SPD’s 15,545,366 (33.5%) votes and 36% of seats. The CDU was
able to win the plurality of votes and seats in this election due to several factors, the most
prominent being, Helmunt Kohl’s position as CDU party leader and Chancellor in 1975, as well
as his popular German reunification platform. The CDU/CSU coalition used their candidate’s
popularity to their advantage and emphasized his credibility and expressed the positive economic
changes and unification strategies that would take place under his administration. In a 1990 New
York Times news article by Protzman, Kohl states, ''Through it, for the people of Germany, unity
will become tangible reality in decisive areas''. In 1990 the CDU capitalized on Kohl’s image of
the German unifier, especially appealing to the new constituency made up of East German
voters. Also, the West German CDU party under Kohl formed strategic alliances with the East
German Christian Democratic parties and contributed to the CDU becoming not only the most
popular party in West Germany, but also the dominant party in East Germany just in time for the
1990 election (Holzhacker, 1999). The 1990 German Democratic Republic’s legislative election
was the first truly free parliamentary election that took place since its formation in 1932. This
was seen as an opportunity by the West German Christian Democrats who helped establish a
strong following of the East German Christian Democrats among eastern Germans throughout
the 1980’s (Holzhacker, 1999). This tactic contributed to making the CDU the most dominant
party in Eastern Germany, and was attributed to the success of the party as a whole after
reunification. This tactic appeared to be successful as the election results showed that the CDU
received the plurality with 36.7% of votes compared to the SPD, that received 33.5% of votes
and the traditionally dominant Eastern German party, the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism),
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received only 1,892,381 votes (16.4%). Evidently, the CDU’s campaign tactics worked when it
came to gaining support from the Eastern German constituency. The CDU’s main campaign
tactic was that of reinforcing the importance of reunification and played off of this notion
throughout its campaign for the 1990 elections.
Although the margin was still quite small, in 1994 the SPD reclaimed the plurality of
votes with 17,140,354 (36.4%) votes and the plurality of seats (38%), compared to the CDU’s
16,089,960 (34.2%) of votes and 36% of seats. The SPD was able to win the plurality once again
by changing their campaign strategies and party platform in order to gain electoral support from
the middle class and attract a larger number of East German voters as well.

Table 2
Republic of Germany Elections to the Bundestag (1972-1994)
Percentage of Votes
Bundestag Election Year

Percentage of Seats

CDU

SPD

CDU

SPD

1972

35.2%

45.8%

36%

46%

1976

38%

42.6%

38%

43%

1980

34.2%

42.9%

35%

44%

1983

38.1%

38.2%

38%

39%

1987

34.4%

37%

35%

37%

1990

36.7%

33.5%

40%

36%

1994

34.2%

36.4%

36%

38%

Figure 2: Republic of Germany Elections to the Bundestag (1972-1994).
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The Case of Munich
Party campaign strategies and platforms are partly reflections of the political parties’
adherence to their constituency’s concerns, whether or not the party succeeded or failed in the
past, what national and international interests are currently present, and what other constituencies
they are attempting to appeal to. Political parties utilized the media, interest groups, and other
forms of outreach in order connect with their constituency and gain more insight on what issues
were most pronounced throughout the local Länder. As said by Helmet Kohl in a 1990s
interview with Vanity Fair;
“I can learn more in a weekend talking with those people about what’s really going on in Germany
than from a month of studying the experts’ reports,” Kohl once remarked. “When there’s
disagreement between what they say and what the polls say, I trust them, because they’re always
right” (Allman).

The electoral weight of interest groups and other political elites are especially significant
when it comes to affecting political party platforms and policy changes by helping voice the
constituency’s concerns to the higher levels of government. Karapin (2003) focuses on the
influence of local challengers and politicians on political elites when it comes to changing
immigration policy. Political elites are considered to be the most politically influential and
powerful individuals involved in policy making. Karapin argues that elite-level politicians used
local level mobilization of both anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant supporters to provoke the
opposition and encourage support of their specific position. He bases his argument on the
analysis of several different cases such as that of Munich’s local government having a SPD-
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Green majority and pro-immigrant stance, yet facing a constituency with a more anti-immigrant
sentiment.
The analysis of Munich’s citizen and elite relationship is what I focus on here, as the
local-level mobilization around anti and pro-immigrant citizen stances shown in this example
help to demonstrate the large influence of public mobilization and interest groups on local and
ultimately, national-level elites.
Munich’s localities were divided into boroughs which were governed by councils. These
councils were made up of a majority of the SPD and Green party from 1990-1994 (Karapin
2003). The SPD-Green coalition were known to have a permissive ideology when it came to
asylum policy, however, in the German Länder of Bavaria as a whole, the view toward refugees
was more conservative and they preferred restriction on asylum policy. Relations among other
cities in Bavaria, including Munich, grew tense throughout the early 1990’s, as they faced a rise
in asylum seekers and limited resources to maintain them. This caused an increase in grievances
among the locals as resources such as housing and jobs had to be shared with refugees. Even
though these sentiments and anti-immigrant movements were commonplace, there were low
levels of anti-migrant violence within Munich and other Bavarian cities. Karapin (2003)
describes the Südpark neighborhood’s divided grievances that led to severe antipathy toward
immigrants. The city council members were mostly members of the SPD and agreed with the
idea of providing social welfare to refugees. When the city came up with the plan for building a
refugee shelter in the Südpark neighborhood, most residents began to protest and express their
grievances by forming interest groups such as the most well-known anti-migrant group, the
Bürgerinitiative Slevogtstrasse/ Südpark (BISSS) that worked towards bringing attention to the
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pressure that was being placed on local communities to house large groups of refugees. They
were backed by local elites and national level politicians who went so far as encouraging many
anti-migrant groups to call the mayor’s office and complain about the refugee shelter and spread
the word about the negative aspects of the shelter. However, the city ignored the pleas given and
anti-migrant groups continued to rally and enact court cases on the grounds that adequate
discussions had not been held on where the correct location for a refugee shelter would be before
having it built, that southern Bavarian neighborhoods were being assigned more than their fair
share of refugees, placing a refugee shelter near schools would be dangerous for their children
and that the male refugees would be particularly violent and inappropriate towards women
(Karapin, 2003). During protests held by anti-refugee and anti-migrants, many signs would read,
“Germans are Asylanten” and “Asylanten Out”, and others would be seen stating that refugees
had more rights than most Germans. Elite-level attention was brought to the concerns related to
the refugee shelter, as well as the anti-immigrant sentiment and the limitations to accommodating
refugees that it implied. SPD member and mayor of Munich from 1984-1993, Gerog
Kronawitter, as well as the BISSS, openly supported a constitutional amendment after seeing the
unbearable conditions and overcrowding of refugee shelters in the area. Other city officials and
borough leaders throughout Munich were against the opening of the shelter in the first place and
stood against further refugee entry into Munich (Karapin 2003). On the other hand, proimmigrant groups were made up of fewer citizens, and were smaller and their movements far less
supported by local and national level elites. This overwhelming support for anti-immigrant
groups over pro-immigrant groups occurred because the elite politicians needed the support from
their localities and this caused them to take sides on the stance of asylum seeker policy
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restrictions (Karapin 2003). Therefore, the majority of the elite-level support went to antiimmigrant movements, as to align with their constituency’s grievances. This caused a great
amount of competition among local elites, both within their localities and in the face of antiimmigrant and asylum movements taking place throughout Germany. The elite-level
competitiveness reached its peak in 1992 when the refugee and migrant inflows increased
drastically, the public’s feelings towards refugees became more negative, and debates among
these elites included further restricting asylum admission policy. Lobbying efforts among local
level politicians to federal-level politicians then helped to create high-level government debates
about the need for asylum restrictions. Local and federal-level election periods called for a rise in
voter support for the candidates who were able to appeal to their constituents and react to their
movements. Therefore, the fact that the majority of citizens believed that there needed to be
asylum reform, and were against providing shelters or locally funded housing for refugees,
aligned with the CDU’s platform. Therefore, the SPD’s pro-immigrant and refugee stance was
not as popular among the public, causing them to lose support at local and federal levels of
government.
Karapin’s main conclusions of the effects of the Länder’s citizens on elite politicians
were that non-violent, anti-refugee reformist groups were wide-spread throughout the 1989-1994
period, especially among Western German citizens. He also found that these non-violent
mobilizations were enhanced by the influence of local political elites along with social and
economic grievances. Both pro and anti-immigrant local movements were seen as normal
throughout the Länder and enhanced political competition and debate among both local and
federal level elites. This increased the prominence of the asylum restriction subject, bringing it to
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the national level and creating more pressure on asylum policy restriction as the Christian
Democrats favored restrictive asylum policies in order to limit refugees in Germany. The CDU’s
general secretary, Volker Ruhe went as far as suggesting that the asylum issue should be used
against the SPD throughout German localities, as the SPD refused to accept the CDU’s proposed
constitutional asylum policy restrictions (Karapin, 2003). This pressure on the SPD party,
especially among local and federal-level elites contributed to their decision to accept the
proposed constitutional amendment on Article 16.

The Media as a Reflection of Public Opinion and Campaign Strategies
Broadcasting Corporations throughout Germany have played a major role in influencing
German public, as well as reflecting German public opinion and political party platforms and
campaign tactics. Depending on which political party or ideological spectrum the broadcasting
corporation is on, a news or radio station will either be identified as “red” -in support of the more
socialist parties such as the SPD, or “black”- in support of more conservative values and the
parties that support them such as the CDU/CSU whose stations were seen throughout Bavaria
and South Western Germany (Conradt, 2005). Most television stations and networks in Germany
of favoritism for the CDU and were more likely to broadcast campaign material that was
flattering of their party and of conservative values. This demonstrates the overall support that the
German public held for the CDU party. During the final stage of election campaigns in 19721987, television debates between parliamentary leaders were commonplace, as the parties would
have a final chance at sharing their policy platforms with the public (Conradt, 2005). This largely
worked in favor of the SPD party, as they received the plurality throughout this time period.
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However, from 1990 until 1998, Chancellor Kohl and the Christian Democrats declined to
participate in the debates out of fear of threatening his party’s campaign with negative media
exposure (Conradt, 2005).
The importance of television and other secondary media exposure for candidates and
their party platforms was especially critical throughout the elections of the mid 1980s through
the 1990s as more Germans relied on the media and more specifically, television ads to educated
them on the policies and strategies of the German candidates and their parties during election
cycles (Donsbach, 1997). It was found that eight out of ten Germans relied mainly on the news
media (television, magazines, and newspapers) to help them decide which parties to support
throughout election cycles during the late 1980s and 1990s (Donsbach, 1997). This reliance on
news media further enhanced the public’s political interests and participation as they were
further exposed to political party platforms and candidates. Most importantly, the media can be
used as a tool in this study, that can be seen as a reflection of the German public’s views on party
candidates, as well as social and economic issues.
The way in which the news media presented these platforms and candidate personalities
was crucial in shaping their public image. During the 1990 elections, Donsbach notes that CDU
party leader Helmut Kohl was mentioned three times more during television ads than the SPD
party leader, Scharping (1997). When the SPD party was covered by the news media during the
1990 and 1994 election campaigns, the SPD party’s coverage focused more on the negative
aspects rather than the favorable ones. The CDU was more often given a favorable image among
news media outlets and used Helmet Kohl’s image to bring more appeal to their party. During
the last few months of the campaigning period, the media more actively presented each party in
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terms of their candidate’s specific personal merits rather than the party’s political motives. Most
German periodicals, such as Die Welt, Focus magazine, and Spiegel presented a favorable image
of Kohl, whereas ZDF magazine favored Scharping, and only the ARD and RTL news magazines
presented both candidates in a more nonbiased way (Donsbach, 1997). Therefore, depending on
the news source used by each citizen, their perspective on the candidate and party platforms
would differ. However, as seen in this study, the majority of media coverage and support was
focused on the CDU/CSU and Kohl as their candidate, as he was popular among the German
public and projected a party platform that aligned with the majority of the public.
Throughout campaign elections, different campaign tactics were used to strategically
enhance a party’s image while expressing unfavorable remarks and pointing out unflattering
features about the opposing party. The SDU had more negative appeals in campaign ads with
30% in 1983 and 45% in 1987, than did the CDU with their 25% in 1983 and 17% in 1987
(Holzhacker, 1999). However, the SPD completely stopped using this tactic in the 1994 elections
and the CDU used it in 25% of its 1994 ads. Holzhacker also found that the SPD stopped using
negative campaign tactics in order to be perceived as more appealing to the general German
public and enhance their chances of winning the plurality in 1994 (1999). The CDU also used
strategies to compare its economic competence against that of the SPD in order to demonstrate
that they could better manage the economy. The SPD on the other hand presented their
comparisons on policy issues against those of the CDU more often. In 1983, they compared their
unemployment solutions with the CDU’s and in 1987, they focused on comparing their
unemployment tactics and social value platforms with the CDU’s because the most prominent
issues during the mid to late 1980s had to do with the negative and residual economic effects of
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oil crisis in 1973 on unemployment (Holzhacker, 1999). However, after the SPD’s loss in 1990,
their clear-cut policy stance and comparisons to their opposition, shifted to more ambiguous
standpoints and backed away from outright comparisons in order to adapt to the electorate
changes and increase their chances of attracting support from last minute and undecided voters,
as well as new Eastern German voters for the next election. This shows the importance of change
in the electoral climate on political party campaign tactics. A 1993 New York Times article
describes the Social Democrats’ campaign tactics in the wake of their effort to win the plurality
in the 1994 parliamentary election. Party leader Rudolf Scharping advised against any radical or
significantly leftist social and economic policy agendas during the campaign cycle (Whitney,
1993). In a speech made to SPD party delegates he states; “I ask everyone here not to make long
opposition speeches, but to lay the groundwork so that the Social Democrats can and should run
the government.” (Whitney, 1993). Rather than stress the negative qualities of their opposition,
the CDU, the SPD focused on sharing the strengths of their own political platform. The most
significant change to the CDU’s campaign strategy since German unification and 1990 elections
was their focusing on the past successes as a party such as that of helping to bring Germany
together under the CDU Chancellor’s leadership. The SPD’s change in campaign strategies were
impacted the most by electoral pressures as the changes in constituency, unification, and
emergence of smaller third parties encouraged the SPD to strengthen their appeal to the masses
depending on public concerns and needs.
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Political Party Reactions to Changes in the Electoral Environment
Holzhacker (1999) demonstrates how changes in the German electoral environment
affected the two largest parties, the CDU/CSU and SPD’s campaign platforms and campaign
tactics, as well as the approach they took to communicate with their constituents. This
longitudinal study gives a critical amount of insight into the electoral effects on the parties’
campaign strategies from the 1987 through the 1994 elections and how they strategized their
campaign communication to favor their party. Holzhakcker points out that these two German
parties are broad-based. In other words, they attract voters from different party backgrounds,
social groups and classes (1999). As a result of this, there is a great deal of competition among
the two in order to secure swing voters whose party support varies from one election to the other.
He takes each election, (1983, 1987, 1990, 1994) and analyzes the responses to the electoral
changes by looking at factors such as the way in which the parties communicate to the electorate
about the appeal of their chancellor candidate, the use of strategic responses- portraying a
favorable image of their party or a negative perspective on the other party. He also looks at the
party’s policy platforms and how their social and economic positions change in each election.
The study is conducted using a content analysis on campaign commercials. The findings showed
that the main ideological differences between the CDU/CSU voters and the SPD voters are their
social values. On the other hand, economic sentiments were widely the same across East and
West Germany. Therefore, his main finding was that the true variations in campaign strategies
were focused on the adapting of the political parties’ social policy platforms to meet constituent
demands.
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After reunification the SPD and CDU/CSU parties faced several factors when it came to
constructing their campaign strategies. During the nineteen ninety campaign, the factors were
composed of appealing to the new Eastern German constituents who were more economically
conservative and socially liberal than Western Germans, the overall increase in support for the
CDU/CSU, as well as new parties entering into the picture, such as the Greens (Hozhakcker,
1999). From the 1987 elections to the 1990, the SPD took on a more leftist approach on social
values in order to appeal to voters that were on the verge of voting for the Greens. However,
after the loss in the 1990 elections, the SPD took on a more leftist economic platform to help
gain the electoral support from the Eastern German working class voters for the 1994 elections
and took less of a stance on its usually progressive social value stance (Hozhakcker, 1999). The
CDU was typically more conservative with its social values and economic standpoint throughout
their election cycles. However, during the 1987 electoral cycle, they were more to the left on the
economic scale because of their platform on Germany’s welfare and in the 1994 cycle they stood
to defend conservative social values (Hozhakcker, 1999). As far as the parties’ emphasis on their
candidates as shown through campaign commercials, the CDU highlighted the leadership skills
and competence of their candidate, whereas the SPD emphasized mostly the personal qualities of
their candidate. The CDU’s 1990 commercials emphasized their candidate’s leadership and
competence largely because of his popularity among both East and West German constituencies,
as he was known as the unifier of Germany.
Scholars on the subject of asylum policy change have observed that the SPD’s decision to
agree to implement a stricter asylum policy resulted in the pressures caused by constituents to
enact this policy change, and that they ultimately gave in to the compromise due to electoral
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pressures (Hozhakcker, 1999; Donsbach, 1997). It is evident that the SPD changed their social
issues platform due to potential electoral consequences, because they sought to appeal more to
the East German constituency and maintain the lower and working class votes overall. The SPD
did not agree to compromise or accept constitutional asylum policy restrictions until it was
proposed to them a third time in 1992, after having lost the 1990 federal elections to their
opponent, the CDU/CSU (Fijalkowski, 1993). It appears that their decision to accept the policy
change was influenced by their pursuit of greater electoral support from their constituents who
requested asylum restrictions. Also, the declining support of the SPD from middle class workers
caused many of them to place their vote on a candidate from a party outside of the two majorities
(Hozhakcker, 1999). The SPD wanted to win back and appeal to these voters along with the new
constituency that was made up of Eastern Germans. The result of the changes made to their
platform and policy stance led to the party’s victory in the 1994 elections.

Chapter 4: The EU’s Role in German Asylum Policy Change
In this chapter I focus on the influence of Germany’s membership in the European
Community (EC) on Germany’s 1992 asylum policy change. I argue that as one of the founding
members of the European Economic Community (EEC) that later became the EU, Germany had
a significant influence on the growth and development of the EU and its member states due to its
economic and military prominence and its crucial role in supporting the development of
European integration programs. Although German nationalistic ideals at times hindered the
public’s support of European integration from Germany’s initial move toward integration in
1950, to the 1970’s, public backing began to increase after the end of the Cold War (Bosche,
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2006). The gradual increase in support throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s helped promote
integration programs and agreements such as the Schengen Agreement in 1985, the Dublin
Regulation in 1990, and European monetary integration in 1999. For the purpose of this study, I
will focus on the Schengen and Dublin agreements and their effects on border, immigration, and
ultimately asylum acceptance restrictions at the EU level, and more specifically, at the German
national level. I also describe how the Dublin and Schengen agreements were used as leverage
by the German government as a way of demonstrating that further restrictions on asylum policy
were needed at the national level to align with the EU’s asylum regulations.
Germany officially joined the European Economic Community (EEC) as a founding
member in 1958 along with Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy and France
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016). The European Community was established after the European
Coal and Steel Community proved to be successful in connecting the European nations both
politically and economically in 1950. The idea behind the creation of the European Community
was to establish a more integrated union among European nations in hopes of avoiding conflict
among their neighbors after witnessing the negative effects of WWII and establish an economic
community among members (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016). As a founding member of the EC,
Germany helped to encourage and establish European policies and regulations at the
intergovernmental level. An example of this can be seen with Germany being the main actor in
the development of policy to encourage further unity among the EU states. The Saarbrucken
agreement was implemented as a border control initiative between Germany and France in 1984
and served as the predecessor to the Schengen agreement (EC, 2000). The agreement capitalized
on the free movement of people between both counties with limited border controls and checks.
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It later became what we know as the Schengen agreement in 1985, after the Benelux countries
decided to join the area of free movement. I will describe in greater detail the specifics of the
Schengen agreement and its impact on asylum policy later on in this chapter. The Schengen
agreement was seen as one of the first major moves toward political integration at the European
level regarding the subject of asylum policy (Bosche, 2006). Among other agreements and
regulations related to the European asylum policy was the Dublin Regulation (Bosche, 2006). As
a signatory of the 1990 Dublin regulation, Germany was able to share the burden of refugee
applications with the other signatory states. The regulation was created as the first
intergovernmental asylum policy and was intended to help reduce and disperse the number of
asylum applications coming into the EU member states and restrict refugees from applying for
asylum to more than one member state (EC, 2016).
German public support of European integration increased in the 1990’s, as concerns
regarding the state of the national economy and rising unemployment rates contributed to the
perceived need for stronger inter-state and supranational support. Also, the German public’s
backing of economically justified restrictions on asylum, and their low levels of support for
human rights initiatives such as granting asylum, seem to have encouraged the German
government to further integrate economic institutions and security measures with that of the
European Union. In 1990 the Eurobarometer public opinion poll reported that 88% of German
nationals polled said they stood in support of European Unification and the European
Community (Eurobarometer, 1990). The majority of participants also held a favorable
impression of the European Commission and European Parliament. When participants were
asked whether or not there should be an EC level charter for the recognition of fundamental
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social rights, 57% of German citizens believed it would be a positive thing, whereas, citizens
from other member state agreed with the statement at a rate of 70-80% (Eurobarometer, 1990).
Sixty- five percent of German interviewees said that the EC should ‘speed up economic,
political, and monetary integration and 68% stated that they felt as though they would be
compatible with a European identity if they were to become more integrated in the European
community. By 1992 the majority of Germans polled on joint EC decision making agreed that
political asylum, immigration policy, and foreign policy decisions should be made at the EC
level (Eurobarometer, 1992). These results demonstrate that the German public’s support for
further European integration and joint decision making at an intergovernmental level became
more favorable in the 1990s, especially when it came to policies affecting the security and
defense of their borders from outside influences such as migrants, refugees, and potential
international threats.
The Schengen Agreement among EU member states was adopted in 1985. However, the
idea behind the agreement was proposed in 1984 when German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and
French president, Mitterand discussed the possibility of opening borders and limiting border
controls by reducing checks and customs between their national borders. This proposal initially
focused on speeding up the process of further European integration and encouraging economic
unity among member states to be a part of the single European market economy (Bosche, 2006).
Thus France and Germany signed the Saarbrucken agreement that served as a model for open
border processes and procedures; the Benelux countries joined in the border-free union with the
signing of the Schengen agreement in 1985.
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After signing an agreement at Schengen, this opened up borders among Germany,
France, Italy and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands) (EUR-Lex,
2009). The agreement established the principle that citizens were allowed free movement among
the signatory nations and instead of having internal borders, one external border stood in its place
(EUR-Lex, 2009). This open-border principle encouraged the EC to address the creation of
security measures and asylum restrictions in order to maintain stability and safety among the
Schengen states. This meant that the police and judiciary systems of these nations had to
coordinate among each other in order to ensure consistence in checks and procedures at the
borders, further enhancing integration among the five member states (Bosche, 2006). Although
only five out of the ten EC nations were signatories of the Schengen Agreement, the free
movement treaty was open to welcoming more EC member nations in the future. The Schengen
Agreement was not yet part of the EC’s governing structure until after the Amsterdam Treaty in
1997, the EC recognized the agreement and reacted by implementing EC-level security measures
and policies such as the Dublin Regulation (EUR-Lex, 2009). Before Schengen, the EC had been
focused on mainly integrating member states economically, however, after the free-movement of
people was established among half of its countries, the EC was forced to create common visa
procedures, common checks at external borders and asylum and refugee regulations. After the
Schengen Agreement was established, asylum, immigration, and border control procedures were
all made more restrictive throughout the EC member states, helping to reduce the number of
asylum applications in each country, especially Germany (Piotrowicz, 1998).
The Schengen Agreement was not met with complete acceptance by EU citizens and
security experts, as many were concerned about crime rates rising, increases in drug trafficking,
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and illegal immigration (Bosche, 2006). Germany in particular was faced with having to react on
a national level to the implications of Schengen. The cooperative framework that was the
Schengen’s free movement of people could not be utilized by Germany without having to face
certain consequences, the most significant being Germany’s reform of its liberal asylum
admissions policy. In order to fully implement the Schengen’s provisions, asylum policy
restriction was needed. The reaction to the Schengen’s free movement procedures at the
European level can be seen with the EC’s Dublin Convention pertaining to the allocation of
asylum applications. At the national level, the reaction to the Schengen and Dublin Regulations
is seen by Germany’s decision to restrict its own constitutional asylum policy in alignment with
the Dublin Regulation’s directives and as a reaction to the Schengen’s allowance of freedom of
movement among EU and non-EU citizens living or visiting another Schengen country (Bosche
2006). If further restrictions at the national level were not taken, Germany may have faced
consequences, the main one being that they would have received larger refugee inflows due to
the openness of the Schengen along with the openness of German asylum policy, both increasing
the appeal to apply for asylum in Germany. Therefore, the implementation of Schengen allowed
Germany to show that asylum procedures and policies were needed at the EC level and that their
national constitutional right to asylum was too liberal and would not align with the Schengen or
EC asylum policies.
The Dublin Regulation was implemented in 1990 as one of the first refugee policies at
the intergovernmental level, placing a common policy on asylum among the EU nations (EPRS
2016). These restrictions on asylum applications established the principle of ‘one EU member
state, one application.’ The provisions of this agreement state that an asylum seeker must apply
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for asylum in the first EU nation they arrive in and that the member state holds jurisdiction over
the application process (EPRS 2016). This restriction enabled EU nations to have more control
over the incoming asylum seekers and set the regulations for each member state to abide by in a
cohesive set of asylum processing procedures at the intergovernmental level that encouraged
quicker and more accurate processing of asylum applications (EPRS 2016). By only allowing
asylum seekers to apply for asylum in one EU nation, this helped to reduce the number of asylum
applications among member states and cut down on asylum ‘shopping’ (Fratzke, 2015).
However, one of the main concerns among nations, especially Germany, was that this regulation
would actually increase the number of asylum applications in their nation, as refugees discovered
Germany’s liberal asylum granting policy and proceeded to enter the EU through Germany in
order to be granted asylum more easily than if they had applied for asylum in another member
state. Therefore, this gave the German government, particularly the CDU/CSU party another
reason to encourage the amendment to the constitutional right to asylum in order to improve its
alignment with the EU-level asylum rules without facing the consequences of having asylum
seekers choosing to apply for asylum in Germany because of its permissive asylum granting
(Bosche, 2006).
Germany’s constitutional asylum policy created a great deal of economic and political
strain throughout the 1980s and 1990s in particular. The emergence of the Schengen agreement
and Dublin regulation immersed Germany more deeply into the European Community and
emphasized the need to restrict asylum policy as a result of citizen grievances about becoming
overburdened by refugees, the economic strains brought on by refugee influxes, and fears about
how future inflows would be handled. German asylum policy was pushed into becoming more
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restrictive and the need for EC intervention and the intergovernmental weaving of asylum policy
measures were evident to most citizens and politicians. Before amending Article 16 of the
German constitution, Germany had difficulty instilling the values of the Schengen and Dublin
regulations, as the constitutional guarantee to asylum defined in Article 16, did not coincide with
the rules and regulations created at the Schengen and Dublin conventions, thus preventing the
German government from taking advantage of the EC-level asylum policies (Bosch 2006).
Article 16’s provisions stated that refugees who proved political persecution would be
guaranteed asylum in Germany regardless of their country of origin. Therefore, the Dublin
Regulation, which stated that the first member state in which a refugee arrives to is the one in
charge of processing the asylum application, was not used as the German asylum processing
procedure until the constitutional asylum policy was changed in 1992. This created greater
tension among German nationals and political parties as center-right parties such as the CDU,
took the issue of asylum and moved it up to the European level in order to overcome the
opposition of the SPD party to further restriction (Bosche, 2006). The CDU utilized the
importance of merging German domestic level asylum policy with the EU’s asylum platform in
order to help place pressure on the SPD, as well as on other members of the Bundestag that did
not initially agree with the policy change. In a speech given by then Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in
which he addressed the Bundestag, he spoke about the importance of increasing Germany’s
European integration following the Maastricht Conference in 1991:

Firstly, there is no going back on the road to European Union. As they face the future,
the Member States of the European Community are now bound together in such a way
that neither disintegration nor regression into the old nation-state mindset, with all its
negative consequences, can be an option. This means that we have realized a core aim of
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Germany’s European policy (CVCE 1991).

Germany’s restriction on asylum policy was enacted in 1993 when the German
Bundestag agreed on the amendment of Article 16 of the Basic Law, creating a more restrictive
asylum policy that would enable them to fully reap the benefits of the Schengen and Dublin
provisions. However, the amendment was seen to be one of the most restrictive in the EU and
had met the Dublin Agreement’s policy framework. Therefore, it can be said that the German
government may have used the Schengen and Dublin regulations as leverage to help show that
further restriction on asylum policy was needed at the domestic level and used it to create a
surprisingly restrictive asylum admissions policy. Bosche (2006) notes in her writing that it is
not uncommon to see EU national governments try and manipulate or overstep domestic
gridlocks by using the European level of governance as leverage, as was done by Germany’s
tactic of utilizing the Schengen and Dublin agreements to add appeal to the need for alignment
with the European platform on asylum policy.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications
5.1 Main Points of Research
In this chapter I review the main points of my research and discuss its findings and
conclusions. I then discuss the implications and importance of these findings in current and
future asylum policy. Lastly, I point to the limitations that I faced when conducting my research
and share recommendations for future research within this subject area.
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The main focus of my research was to discover the factors which may have contributed to
the asylum policy change in Germany from liberal with its implementation in 1945, to restrictive
in 1992 with the amendment of Article 16 of the Basic Law. After reviewing the literature and
the data, I narrowed the factors down to the following: the rise in asylum applications and overall
migration in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the end of the Cold War, as well as the onset of
the German economic recession after the 1973 Oil Crisis; both contributed to the overall
grievances and anti-migrant sentiment felt by the German public, causing electoral pressures on
German political parties that seem to have ultimately led to the Bundestag’s agreement on
restricting the German constitutional right to asylum. Germany’s place as a founding member of
the EU also contributed to catalyzing the agreement on asylum policy change, as German asylum
policy was not in alignment with EU policy until after the amendment of Article 16. In the
following section, I will discuss in detail the findings pertaining to each one of these factors and
discuss the conclusions that I reached as a result of the findings.

5.2 Findings and Conclusions
In this section I review the findings of this study and provide concluding remarks.
It seems the influxes in asylum applications at the end of the Cold War affected the German
public’s view on migrants and asylum seekers in a negative way and brought more attention to
the subject of asylum policy change in the media, throughout the Länder where most citizen
grievances were voiced, among political party agendas and platforms, and within the German
government’s legislative action towards asylum processing procedures as well. German
economic conditions played a main role in enhancing the public’s anti-migrant sentiments and

64

provided further reasoning behind the perceived need to control immigrant and refugee inflows
in order to protect the welfare state, job markets, and economic stability throughout Germany.
Before the 1973 Oil Crisis, and subsequent economic crisis in Germany and other EU countries,
refugees and guest workers were more widely accepted by the German public. However, due to
the economic difficulties in the mid-1970’s, Germans became wary of admitting migrants as
readily because of high unemployment rates and economic uncertainty that was predicted to
become worse as more migrants arrived. The economic pressures felt by German reunification in
1989 also highlighted the fears and disapproval of Germans towards migrants and refugees
arriving from Eastern Germany and Eastern European counties.
These anti-migrant sentiments were at times presented in the form of violence and hatecrimes against migrants and refugees. Manifestations of fear and hatred were mostly conducted
by members of nationalist and Neo-Nazi groups toward refugees as violent crimes reached 7,121
in 1992 and 10,561 in 1993 (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Although violent acts toward
immigrants were seen mainly by these nationalist groups and most Germans did not partake in
these types of activities, public opinion polls demonstrate the German public’s unease regarding
the German economic state as seen from the polling results conducted in 1974-1992 by the
Eurobarometer. Polling results consistently showed German apprehension towards high
unemployment and inflation rates. It seems as though economic uncertainty may have
contributed to the majority of Germans agreeing that the rights of non-EEC nationals should be
restricted and that their national constitutional right to asylum needed to change. Also, the low
levels of public opinion support for granting asylum as a fundamental human right, and low
levels of support for social policies being implemented at the EU level, show that most Germans
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polled felt that granting asylum was not as important as granting other social rights, and that
policies regarding social values and social rights should be kept within the jurisdiction of
national policymaking (Eurobarometer 1990). However, there were still German nationals who
felt as though certain social rights, such as the right to asylum should be a policy area instilled at
the EU level. Support for EU level integration increased in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, as
German public support of joint EU decision-making on asylum, foreign policy, and immigration
policy rose (Eurobarometer, 1992).
The overall German sentiment regarding non-EEC nationals can be seen as skeptical, as
Eurobarometer results showed that Eastern German migrants were favored over migrants from
other European nations, especially over Turkish migrants, who were seen to be the most
culturally and ethnically different from Germans. This is also seen with the majority of Germans
saying that there were too many non-EC migrants in Germany. The majority of Eastern and
Western Germans agreed in the 1991 Eurobarometer, that further restrictions were needed on
admitting refugees seeking humanitarian aid, demonstrating that the rise in refugee inflows may
have led to these sentiments regarding asylum restriction. The 1992 Eurobarometer results show
that most Germans agreed upon political asylum, immigration policy, and foreign policy being
part of joint EC decision making. This may be a result of the German public’s view of their
national government not taking adequate initiative to protect their borders from outside
influences and that EC-level decision making would be able to provide restrictions on asylum
admissions policies, and decrease immigration and asylum inflows. Lastly, the German public’s
fear of having to pay for others, especially those who were non-EC nationals, suggests that these

66

fears may have been enhanced by the economic instability and apprehension of sharing the
national welfare benefits with non-German and non-EC nationals.
After proposing the amendment of Article 16 of the Basic Law in 1988 and 1991 to the
SPD, the CDU was unsuccessful at passing the legislative amendment mainly due to the SPD’s
plurality of seats in the Bundestag. The SPD held the plurality of seats in the Bundestag from
1972 until the 1990 federal election, when the CDU received the plurality of the vote (36.7%)
and 40% of seats in the Bundestag. Tactics such as forming a coalition with the CSU and their
party leader, Helmut Kohl’s German unification campaign strategy that held up well with the
Eastern German constituents overall, contributed to swinging the plurality of votes in his party’s
direction. It appears to be that after their 1990 defeat, the SPD reorganized their campaign tactics
and party strategies in order to appeal to the new East German constituency and uphold their
popularity among working class citizens as well.
The importance of interest groups, political elites and local level mobilization showed to
play a crucial role in bringing the grievances of German citizens among the Länder, to the higher
levels of government. The case of Munich, demonstrates that the local tensions rose in
correlation with inflows of refugees in 1990, as competition for limited resources such as
housing and jobs became a main grievance among Munich’s citizens. Although the city’s council
was made up of mostly SPD members who favored providing social welfare to asylum seekers,
several uprisings and demonstrations, as well as the formation and mobilizations of anti-migrant
interest groups in neighborhoods such as Südpark, brought more attention to the refugee issue at
local and national levels. Munich’s mayor, Gerog Kronawitter (1984-1993) and the antiimmigrant group, the BISSS supported a constitutional amendment on the German asylum policy
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after seeing the conditions in which refugees had to live, facing overcrowding in refugee housing
units, and witnessing protest and attacks on refugees and other migrants throughout the city
(Karapin 2003). Although there were pro-immigrant groups as well, they made up a much
smaller portion of the public and were not as readily supported by political elites. The study
shows that both pro and anti-migrant movements were commonplace throughout the Lander and
that political elites had played a main role in their mobilization; it appears that most political
elites were aligning and supporting anti-migrant movements, especially when the majority of
their constituency held anti-migrant ideals. The local level interest groups and demonstrations, as
well as the debate among political elites at local levels regarding asylum policy reform, helped to
bring the topic of asylum policy compromise to the forefront of the national-level of government
(Karapin, 2003).
The prominence of the media in reflecting the views of the German public, as well as
demonstrating political party tactics showed to have also played a role in influencing the public
image of the CDU and SPD which may have contributed to the outcome of the 1990 and 1994
elections, as well as the change in the SPD’s political platform and their compliance with
amending asylum policy in 1992. The news media’s more positive coverage of the CDU/CSU
party and their party leader Helmut Kohl, seems to have encouraged further support for their
party (Donsbach, 1997). The campaign tactics that each party used played a main role in
demonstrating how they tried to appeal to their constituency and promote their party platform. In
1987 and 1990, the SPD party used more negative appeals in their ads, whereas during the 1994
election, they stopped using negative ads directed toward their opposition, the CDU and used
more of an ambiguous approach to addressing policy platforms in their ads as an attempt to gain
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more voter support. The SPD’s change in its campaign strategies and platform seem to have been
attributed to the electoral pressures they faced after German unification with the new East
German constituency, as well as having lost the 1990 federal elections and wanting to regain the
plurality of support they had in previous years.
Finally, according to the longitudinal study on campaign commercials conducted by
Hozhakcker, it appears that electoral changes within the political environment had a direct effect
on party campaign strategies and tactics. The findings show that the main ideological difference
among the German constituency was on social issues. Sentiments towards economic issues are
among the most consistent throughout the German constituency. Therefore, the adjustments
made by the SPD and CDU in their campaign tactics, were designed to align with their
constituent’s ideologies and were seen within their party’s social policy platform throughout
their campaigns, asylum policy being one of them. Therefore, it can be said that the SPD’s
agreement with compromising on asylum policy change could have also been brought on by the
constituency’s pressures on the party to align with asylum policy reform, and become more
moderate on their social values in order to appeal to the working class and Eastern German
electorate. The changes to their party platform and campaign tactics seemed to have helped the
SPD win the plurality in the 1994 elections by gaining electoral support from the German
working class and new East German constituency.
Although Germany’s EU membership is not as directly reflected on Germany asylum
policy change compared to the other factors, it was still an important facet to take into account
when considering the culmination of factors that led to German asylum policy reform.
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The German public’s support for furthering European integration was not a largely
supported movement until the 1980s and 1990s. Support increased due to high unemployment
rates and economic decline that encouraged German nationals to see the need for further
integration and support among EU member states. Economically motivated restrictions on
asylum, the low levels of support for social and human rights initiatives and sentiments about the
national government not doing enough to properly address these issues, may have contributed to
the public’s support of further integrating policy areas such as immigration policy, asylum
policy, and foreign policy.
Germany’s place among the other members of the EU is one of leadership, as Germany
was one of the founding members and contributed to the establishment of many EU integration
programs. This can also be seen in Germany’s border control agreement with France that later
became the Schengen agreement. The Dublin agreement was then implemented by the EU as an
intergovernmental asylum policy, partially in response to the open-movement brought on by the
Schengen agreement. The Schengen agreement’s provisions allowed EC nationals to travel
throughout other signatory nations with minimal border checks and processing. This allowed for
ease of travel and trade, however, security measures were seen as necessary to protect the
external border.
The Dublin regulation was implemented in response to the Schengen agreement, in order
to allow for quicker processing of asylum applications and protect signatory states from large
refugee inflows. The agreement states that asylum seekers are only able to apply for asylum in
the first member state in which they arrive in. This allowed for not only quicker processing, but
also helped to control refugee inflows and ‘asylum shopping’ (Fratzke, 2015). However,
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Germany was not able to utilize the Dublin regulation to its full potential because of its
permissive constitutional asylum policy which was not in alignment with the EU provision on
asylum. This allowed the CDU to point out the misalignment of the German asylum policy with
that of the EU’s, in order to place more pressure on the SPD to agree to asylum policy change
(Bosche, 2006). Therefore, the German government seems to have used the Schengen and
Dublin agreements, as well as European integration as leverage, in order to help pass asylum
policy reform at the national level.

5.3 Implications and Recommendations
The findings of my study suggest that migrant and economic pressures played a direct
role in influencing German public opinion on the right to asylum, on Germany’s need to control
asylum inflows, and protecting the German economy and welfare state from further decline.
These sentiments then seem to have contributed to influencing political party strategies and
platforms that adapted in accordance to their constituency’s grievances and requests, which were
mobilized by interest groups and political elites from the local-levels, to the national level, as
seen with the case study of Munich. Germany’s place in the EU also contributed to the perceived
need for constitutional asylum policy reform, as Article 16 of the German Basic Law prevented
Germany from implementing the Dublin Regulation’s asylum application processes. This need
for alignment with the EU’s asylum policies was promoted by the CDU in order to place
pressure on the SPD to support the asylum policy reform. Pressures from the CDU, the
constituency, political elites, and interest groups, encouraged the SPD to change its platform in
order to appeal to the electorate and improve the party’s chances of winning the plurality in the
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1994 election. Ultimately, it seems that the SPD’s alignment with the electorate’s demands
affected their decision to compromise on asylum policy change in 1992.
The implications drawn from my research findings can be used as a model for analyzing
the contributing factors that cause other nations in the EU to create more restrictive asylum
policies. They could also be used to help predict whether or not another nation will restrict their
asylum policy in the wake of a similar refugee crisis based on the same factors I analyzed in my
study. Also the change in Germany’s asylum policy during the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis to an
‘open-door’ policy on asylum, demonstrates that the topic of asylum policy change in Germany
is ongoing and subject to future study. This time the policy change is seen to have moved from
restrictive to liberal, making this research study relevant to modern-day asylum policy reforms
and bringing up the question of why German asylum policy has become more liberal in the wake
of the 2015 refugee crisis, when asylum policy became restrictive in 1992 after Germany faced
large influxes in refugee inflows as well.
One limitation of this study may be the lack of primary sources to support the argument
made. If I were to continue this research, I would use primary data such as interviews with
academic experts and public officials.
Further research in this subject area would be to conduct a longitudinal study, in order to
examine whether or not the same social, economic, and political factors contributed to the
German asylum policy changes that took place in 2015 during the wake of the Syrian Refugee
Crisis. Furthermore, it may be useful to use the same factors described in my study, and apply
them to nations that have implemented asylum policy change, particularly in the midst of a
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refugee crisis or influx. These factors could be provided as a model to predict the causes that
account for asylum policy change.
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